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Abatract
I begin with an analysis of physical corruption, in the hope 
that it will throw light on moral corruption. An understanding of 
corruption of either sort requires an understanding of what it is to 
be in a sound state. I consider the criteria for natural soundness 
and corruption, and then attempt to discover what the state of moral 
soundness might be. I first consider innocence, but argue that this
cannot be taken as the morally sound state. Corruption of innocence is
properly seen as the moral corruption of an innocent person; moral 
corruption can follow other states than innocence and must be contrasted 
with a state of moral soundness other than innocence.
My second suggestion is that integrity is an essential part of
the state of moral soundness. Integrity is seen as the keeping of
commitments^  both those to others and those to ideals or values. I 
argue that we cannot think of a man who lacks integrity as a good man. 
Corruption is then identified as a rejection of the binding force of 
commitments* I test this criterion against various examples of 
corruption. This leads to qualification and the recognition of a 
commitment to obey one's conscience, and further to a discussion of the 
relation between self-deception and corruption. In the last chapter I 
try to show that moral corruption and natural corruption have much in 
coasnon, and can be seen as the same process operating in two different 
spheres.
Chapter 1. Natural Corruption
The Q£D saya that when eomething ia corrupt it is 'changed from 
the naturally sound condition'• An analysis of corruption must give an 
account of how a corrupt thing departs from its sound state. One must 
give an account of what it is for something to be sound, and then lay down 
the conditions under which a failure to be sound amounts to corruption.
The physical realisation of the sound and therefore also of the corrupt 
state %dll differ according to what kind of thing is in question. The 
sound state for a tree will involve growing leaves at the proper time while 
for a bird or a piece of metal it will be somethi % quite different. 'She 
physical description of the sound state will vary from kind to kind and is 
a matter for scientists, not philosophers. Likewise with corruption: 
a philosophical account will explain what it is for anything to be corrupt 
in terns of a departure from the sound state, and scientists will determine 
how each thing satisfies these conditions after its kind. I begin with such 
an account of corruption in the natural sphere. X shall then ask what are 
the states of moral soundness and moral corruption, and finally discuss 
what, if anything, moral and natural corruption have in common.
Thià first thing to say about the sound state which we attribute to 
anything is that it must be a possible state for that thing. We couldn't, 
for example, call a tree corrupt on the grounds that it can't sing. Singing 
is not the kind of thing trees can do; no tree could possibly sing.
Anything which can sing isn't a tree. Therefore the ability to sing cannot 
form part of the sound state for trees. The sound state in contrast with 
which something is called corrupt must be one in which, had certain 
specifiable things been otherwise, it would have been. Aristotle may be 
able to find a sense in which a man is more perfect by becoming more god­
like, but a man cannot be called corrupt for lacking immortality or 
omniscience.
But this doesn't take us very far. lAie sound state is not any old
State which the thing could get into. The state which a tree would be in 
after a nuclear war (if it existed at all) is a perfectly possible state 
for it to be in, but isn't likely to be sound. 3he sound state is the 
state a thing ought to be in. This isn't the'ought'of obligation but 
the 'ought' we find in 'There ought tobe a plentiful crop of tomatoes 
this year'. This is a statement about what we have reason to expect.
Just so a stranger might say, faced with one of our sad elms, 'But elms 
ought to have leaves on in June". This is a claim about, what the sound
state for elms is. The sound state is the state we would expect to find a
I
thing in if we knew nothing about its individual history but only what
kind of thing it is. | \
’ \
This kind of 'ou^t' is not restricted to 'sound state' claims, 
as the tomato example shows. Indeed it can be used to make the opposite 
claim, as in 'If this trend continues those trees ought to get the disease 
next year'. Though this use is rather strained. But in this example we 
can see what the 'ought' claim is based on - conditionally on the continu­
ation of the trend. There ia a condition buried in the tomato example 
too, though it is one which is already satisfied; something like 'since 
it has been so warm and sunny'. In these two examples specific conditions 
obtain which lead us to expect a certain outcome. The sound state is alsD 
a claim about what we may expect. If we can find out why we may expect it
we shall get a clearer idea of what it is to be in a sound state. Does
the elm claim - the sound state claim - have such a condition? No; it is 
not a claim about what in some particular circumstances we should expect,
but about what in general we may e3q>ect. It is a statement about elms as
a kind. If the statement were 'this tree ou|^ t to have leaves on in June'
and it was questioned, one could reply 'because it is an elm, and elms....'.
What I called the conditions in the non-sound state examples 
are reasons why we should on a certain occasion expect a plentiful crop
or diseased trees. The reason why we should expect leaves on this tree in
June, however, is because that is part of the natural development and 
behaviour of elms, and this tree is an elm. To be in a sound state is to
be at some stage of the natural development of things of the appropriate 
kind. Further, it must be the right stage, given the age of the specimen. 
The size which is sound for a one-year-old elm is not sound for a ten-year- 
old elm, for an elm which develops naturally continues to grow after it is 
one year old.
What the natural development of a given kind is is discovered by 
observation of members of it. But not by majority verdict; the sound state 
for a six-year-old elm may not be that state which most six-year-old elms 
are found to be in. It may be that most or even all elms have Dutch Elm 
Disease; but still an elm with the disease is not sound. An observer may, 
if all his specimens have some peculiarity, be led to a mistaken view as 
to what the sound state is; but even in the absence of any sound specimens 
it may be possible to tell that the specimens one has are unsound, and even 
what it would be for them to be sound. This is a possible theme for science 
fiction or after-the-bomb stories: a shrewd observer realises, concerning 
some creatures which everyone else takes to be normal specimens of a certain 
kind, that they are in fact unsound or abnormal specimens of some other kind, 
as Gulliver is forced to realise that the Yahoos are not a separate species 
but degenerate men. How is this done? If we can find criteria by which 
a specimen might be judged unsound without comparing it with others of its 
kind, it will be clear that, and perhaps why, the sound state is not by 
definition the state which most meoA>er8 are in.
If one has only diseased elms, but an abundance of sound specimens 
of other kinds of tree, the task is easy. It may be clear enough that the 
elm is a tree, and trees normally have sap, unbroken branches, leaves and 
80 on. These elms don't have these things, so there must be something 
wrong with them. But this proceeds via a knowledge of the sound state 
for the genus 'tree'. In the absence of such assistance but with some 
knowledge of living things, one might note the weakness of the elm, its 
brokenness, its dryness. One m#it notice that while there are some green 
shooth, elsewhere similar shoots are dry and dead. One might see that 
while some small shoots are green and supple, the large limbs are dry.
black and brittle. One's reaction mig^t be, 'It can't be meant to be 
like this'.
Not to pursue this story to tedious length, the point I wish to 
draw from it is that 'natural development ' can't just mean usual development, 
If one observes the kind of activity which creatures of some species 
carry out, the kind of nourishment they need to survive, and so on, one[ 
will take the natural development to be that which makes ammember of the 
species reasonably efficient at these things. One must form some idea of 
%diat that creature's wellbeing might consist in; the sound state is one 
which allows it to enjoy reasonable wellbeing. If one meets a creature 
with patchy fur, blind, incapable of much movement although it has legs 
which seem suitable for moving around on, it will be clear that it is not 
in a sound state even if one is not acquainted with that kind of creature. 
(It may not be an easy matter to determine wellbeing. One might think 
at first sig^ t that a two toed sloth had some horribly lingering diseaise; 
yet further observation of how its capacities and its needs for life and 
survival fit together say show that it is quite normal for a sloth to move 
so slowly).
This account concentrates on living things, while kinds of stuff
may also be in a sound or unsound state. Presumably there is some normal
course of development by which metal and stone come into existence. But 
t:jhey do not continue to change as living things do. However, one may
use the same sort of model; the natural course is for atone to be formed
in a certain way and to have a certain chemical composition, and it is 
sound as long as it retains that composition.
The sound state and the normal development of things of a certain 
kind have a special role to play in explanation. No individual explanation 
is usually required of why a certain thing is in a sound state. Thus the 
explanation of why a certain tree has leaves in June is that it is an elm 
tree and it is part of the natural development of elm trees to have 
leaves in June (in the northern hemisphere). Any further expljanation 
will apply to the kind as a whole; in this ease the function that leaves
have for elm trees. If anything departs from;the sound state, an explanation 
is required of why that particular thing isn't sound. It may be objected 
here that, to return to a previous example, if we were to find a tree 
in a sound state after a nuclear war, we should want an explanation. But 
this is because we already have a specific reason to think that it ad^t 
not be sound. The sound state is the state which things of that kind have 
a natural tendency to be in, the state they will be in if left to 
themselves. It ia not a necessary condition for x to belong to the kind 
f that it is in the sound state of kind A corrupt is still a 
But the sound state tells one what ^  are like, the sound f is the good 
specimen. The diseased or unsound elm will provide one with a perfectly 
good definition: an elm is anything which correct scientific theory 
assigns to the same species as this.* But if you want to know what elms 
are like you must look at a sound elm. And the way the scientific theory 
woiics to assign this unsound one and the sound ones to the same species 
is to discover the natural development of the species and then explain 
what in this case has interfered to prevent it from developing that way.
This is by no means a vacuous explanation. There is a perfectly clear 
difference between that which isn't in the sound state of elmhood 
because it isn't an elm and has no tendency whatever to be in that state, 
and one which is and has but has been prevented from being so. The 
preventive agent must be discoverable and describable. But this would 
allow one to say that all elms are unsound and diseased even if one 
had never encountered a sound elm; if one could identify some disease 
«hich they all had. Also it might permit one to say %Aat the sound state 
for elms is even if one had never observed it. One could do so if one 
could work out from the unsound specimens what would happen if the 
interfering factor were «unseat. For this one would have to identify the 
interfering factor and discover its effects and tendencies.
(This might work both ways. If, when the goddess with the apples of 
youth is removed, all the gods begin to age, this might lead one to 
conclude that they aren't gods at all but humans who have managed to
improve on the natural human state).
A possible objection to taking soundness to be some stage of 
natural or normal development must here be faced. Death, it may be 
complained, is natural. If we are to expect anything for certain to 
befall a living thing, it is death. One may be able to deny that a 
creature afflicted with mortal disease is a sound creature by pointing 
to a virus or other cause as an external a^nt interfering with its 
natural functioning. But not all creatures die of disease; some die of 
old age. They just wear out. What more natural than that? Yet a dead 
creature is surely not sound. It may be correct but will not satisfy 
this objector to claim with Aristotle that a dead cat is not a cat.
(Does 'cat' in 'dead oat' occur in an 'inverted commas use'?) Also it 
doesn't deal with the cat which is dying of bid age; certainly a cat, 
not diseased, but surely not in a sound state.
One might turn back to my remarks about wellbeing. The sound 
state includes not only a certain physical composition but the capacity 
to perform certain activities and to keep alive given adequate supplies 
and barring accidents. Also a system, living or not, is by definition 
self-maintaining. It is not functioning properly as a system unless it 
maintains itself. A dying cat's system is still functioning, but feebly, 
not enough to permit it to do much, nor enough to support it for long, 
nor enough to renew parts which need replacing if it is to keep going.
On these grounds we can deny that it is sound. But this complaint makes 
necessary a qualification to the claim that unsoundness requires some 
interfering factor. We can say what prevents it from being sound, but 
it is not any external interference; it is simply the fact that the parts 
are worn. We must then say that if something is unsound, either there 
must be some interfering or preventative cause, or it is suffering from 
ordinary wear and tear.
Finally, death is certainly natural, but it is not natural for 
an individual living thing, in the sense that it has a 'life support
system* which is directed ugainst death, and it is only when the system 
fails that death ensues; in no sense is the system aimed at death, it 
just can't keep going for ever.
To turn to corruption, it is not sufficient for this that a 
thing be unsound. There is nothing corrupt about a stunted tree or a 
one=legged man. In looking for examples of corruption our thoughts 
would most naturally turn first to kinds of stuff; especially organic 
stuff such as wood and flesh, but also rusty metal and perhaps even stone, 
for instance the stones^ of Venice. Here the'most obvious feature is 
disintegration. Rusty metal is no longer solid; it is full of holes 
and falls into pieces. Rotten wood is light and spongy; one can push 
one's finger into it and crumble it with one's hands. The rotten and 
corrupt is weak and unreliable ; rotting beams will not support a roof, 
nor a rusty chassis a car body. But the corruption of these stuffs 
doesn't consist solely in their unfitness for our purpoeee* We choose 
these materials for these purposes in the first place because unlike some 
other materials, e.g. spider-webbing, they have when sound a certain 
strength and solidity suitable for holding up houses and things. Corrupt 
metal or wood has lost its proper strength and solidity and either is 
dis integrating or tends to disintegrate under slight pressures.
But disintegration is not sufficient for corruption. For wood 
or metal may be pounded to pieces; they will disintegrate if enough 
pressure is applied without being at all corrupt. Less pressure is 
required to make corrupt material disintegrate than to make sound material 
disintegrate. But corrupt material will also disintegrate by itself.
In corruption, there is a process of disintegration going on within the 
material itself; the disintegration is caused by a process within the 
material and not by pressure applied from outside. There may be an 
external cause, such as moisture, which sets the process going. But in 
corruption the moisture doesn't cause the disintegration by wearing 
away the material; it does so by starting a process within the material 
which then continues independently. The initiating cause may also be the
8removal of some factor which preventa corruption; as when life departs 
from an animal body the cleaning and purifying mechanisms cease, and 
the body begins to corrupt. Once rust or rot or putrefaction begin, they 
continue and spread by an internally process; corrupting parts
infect sound parts. If one wants to stop the process one has to remove 
not some external cause but that part of the material itself which is 
already corrupt. If the cause which set the process going ia still present 
one will have to remove that too otherwise it will start again. Yet it 
is still true that removal of infected material stops the process even 
if it does immediately start again.
It may not be strictly correct to say that the stones of Venice
are corrupting. They are disintegrating as the result of chemical
deposits from nearby industry, and this process seems to be self- 
perpetuating. Yet if one removed the chemicals from the face of the stone 
the disintegration would stop, without removal of any 'infected* stone. 
Moth, also, is said to corrupt; but this is to treat the moth grubs 
as part of the very cloth. Again, one could stop the process by removing 
the moths without having to cut out any infected cloth. Rust seems more 
properly a form of corruption; the metal itself undergoes a change and 
becomes oxidised and this oxidisation will continue to spread from 
infected to uninfected parts even if the metal is removed from the rain
and put in a shed. But the central example of corruption is the
decomposition of animal and vegetable matter.
This feature of corruption, that it goes on autonomously within 
the corrupting material and is not carried on, only initiated, by an 
external cause, may seem to make trouble for my earlier account of the 
cound. I equated the sound state with being at some appropriate stage 
of natural development. Natural development was the course the object 
will pursue or the state it will be in if left to itself, to fulfil its 
own tendencies, without being prevented from doing so. But the inn:>r 
and autonomous operation of corruption seems to allow it to satisfy this 
condition. Obviously the corrupt is not sound. Some adjusbpent is
necessary. Peihaps we might try to make something of the initiating 
cause of corruption, to make a case for calling this 'interference within 
the meaning of the act'. But I don't think this will work. For what is
“Nr 1 %
responsible for the initiation of corruption may be nothing more than a 
favourable causal condition. In the case of animal bodies I mentioned 
the departure of life. (This is neither a suffioient nor a necessary 
causal condition for the operation of corruption, because on the one hand 
of embalming and on the other gangrene. But we may ignore the necessary 
qualifications here). Yet certain favourable conditions are also 
necessary for things to be in a sound state. And there is no warrant for 
calling the conditions necessary to soundness normal conditions and the 
conditions neresdary to corruption abnormal(interferences. For a dead 
animal body will corrupt if left alone, while if interfered with, say 
by deepfreezing, the flesh may remain sound. (This isn't inconsistent 
with my earlier claim that death is unsound. A dead cat is not a sound 
cat, but it may be coo^ osed of sound flesh).
To clear up this difficulty we need to return again to the 
connection between soundness and wellbeing. It may be odd to talk of the 
wellbeing of pieces of stuff, yet to cease to exist might be said to be 
'bad' for them. There is a close connection between corruption and 
ceasing to exist. To be in a corrupt state is to be at some stage in the 
process of corruption. The process of corruption Is a process as a result 
of which things cease to exist. Not the càùy one, for they may be burnt 
or worn away for instance. But corrupting things undergo chemical 
change which is infectious and as a result decompose and cease to exist. 
Although coal results from the corruption of wood, it is not itself 
corrupt wood. The wood has rotted away and ceased to exist, and in the 
end those same elements or some of them may combine in a different way 
to form coal. Anything in a corrupt state is on its way to extinction, it 
is tending to cease to exist; though the process may be halted.
In the case of inorganic stuffs our extra condition for the 
sound state must simply be 'provided that this state is not part of an
10
internal process leading towards non-existence'• But organic material
is the most central subject of corruption; it seems probable that rust
r %
may be called a corruption of metal because of its similarities to the 
corruption of animal and vegetable matter. And for organic stuff we may 
make the condition more interesting. Organic stuff is sound only if it 
is suitable to support life, the life of the kind of living things 
which are composed of that kind of stuff. This would have to be qualified 
in some way because my kitchen table doesn't seem suitable to form part of 
a living tree, yet it isn't rotten. Seasoned wood has had the sap dried 
out of it; yet it retains its composition and organisation by which sap 
could flow through it. Rotten wood, decomposing into its elements, 
couldn't carry sap, as we see on trees with rotten branches. When a 
person dies the system fails in some way, but the material of the person's 
body remains for a short time sound, fit to support life. When it corrupts 
it becomes unsuitable. The soundness of organic matter thus is not judged 
solely according to its own existence as stuff, but/fîl®?t8^Sxïiie§ce as 
stuff suitable to constitute the appropriate animal or vegetable; it was 
generated as part of that animal or vegetable and precisely as being stuff 
suitable for such a role.
We have then the following features of corruption. It is a 
process of disintegration and in the case of organic matter decomposition. 
Though the initial change may be set off by an external cause, it then 
proceeds by infection <f sound by unsound parts within the material itself. 
To stop the process one must remove the infected material. It is a process 
which leads to the non-existence of the corruptiCng material. In the case 
of organic matter the process of corruption unfits it to constitute the 
body of a living thing.
I have so far discussed the corruption of matter, for the central 
application of the concept of corruption seems to be to the decomposition 
of animal and vegetable matter. But is there corruption of living things 
as such? It is true that the flesh of an animal or the wood of a tree 
may corrupt while the animal or tree is still alive, as in gangrene or
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Dutch KLm Disease. But this is still the corruption of the stuff of 
which the animal or tree is made, not of the animal or tree itself.
The corrupting stuff does become unfit to support life and will eventually 
kill the object if not cut out in time. But I now want to ask whether 
there is such a thing as the corruption of animals and vegetables as 
living systems, even though their matter may remain sound.
I think cancer may be described as a corruption of a living 
system as such. The 0£D says cancer is 'a malignant growth or tumour 
that tends to spread and to reproduce itself; it dorrodes the part 
concerned, and generally ends in death*. Cancer does lead to corruption 
of the stuff of the body, both because it leads to death and possibly 
because it results in dead cells within a living body, which corrupt.
But as well as causing corruption, it is itself a corruption. The body 
is a living system which maintains itself. Part of proper maintenance 
is the growth of new cells to replace worn out ones. In cancer, a certain 
kind of cell is reproduced too fast so that instead of maintaining the 
system this activity damages and destroys it. Instead of maintaining 
the organ in question the tumour eats it away; tumours also damage the 
system by taking up space and impeding the operation of the organ where 
they are and then other organs. Here we have many of the features of 
corruption previously noted. There may be an external cause, such as 
smoking, of the original mutation in the cells which makes them begin to 
behave in this way, but once the cancer is started the cells reproduce 
themselves with the mutation and spread the malfunction to other parts 
by means of the ordinary operation of the system itself (e.g. the blood­
stream). The system which should maintain itself is destroying itself.
If one wants to stop the process one must kill or remove the affected 
cells, that is, a part of the corrupt system itself. The system has dis­
integrated, in the sense that instead of working in harmony, one part is 
working against other parts. And it ends with the non-existence of the 
system. There can, then, be corruption of a living system as such, and 
any disease in which the system betakes itself to self-destruction by
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means of its own maintenance mechanisms gone wrong, is such a corruption.
Here ia another example of a corruption of a different kind of 
living system. It is a fanciful story, but if it took place would 
constitute the corruption of a ^ecies. Imagine a species of fowl which 
has a mating ritual, well adapted to its preservation, among the features 
of which is the attraction of females to males with red feathers on their 
heads. Some members of the species contract a disease which weakens and 
deforms them, and at the same time gives them remaricably fine red head 
feathers. Females prefer, therefore, diseased males to sound ones and, 
if we may support both the debilitation and the feathers hereditary, this 
process will continue. The result will be weaker and weaker members of 
the species, until they are unable to support the rigours of existence at 
all.
The species’s capacity for survival is impaired. But this isn’t 
sufficient for corruption; a species all of whose members are weakened by 
disease or famine wouldn't count as corrupt. Nor is it sufficient if they 
simply degenerate. Degeneration may come about as a result of scarcity of 
food, or absence of some essential element of diet; external influences.
The reason why I call this case of mine one of corruption is that the 
mechanism by which the degeneration takes place is the breeding habits of 
the species itself, which should maintain and assist the survival of the 
species. The species, here, is considered not simply as a collection of 
individuals, but as a collection which has a system for ensuring that 
there continues to be a collection of similar individuals. It is this 
system which is now tending to bring it about that there is no longer 
such a collection. The species considered as such a system is not just 
dying out, it is killing itself off, and the only way to stop the process 
would be to remove a part of the system itself, viz, some of the individuals 
which compose it.
A similar phenomenon has occurred in human behaviour; perhaps 
it is also a kind of corruption of our species. This is the elevation of 
the consumptive woman as an ideal of female beauty. To find beautiful and
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to prefer as a mate a wcxnan with a mortal disease, on account of the
appearance and weakness which her disease gives her, does seem a kind of
corruption, not moral but of the species as a survival system.
Consumption is now no longer mortal,unless untreated; it also (as a 
result?) seems to have lost its fascination.
The ideas of survival and extinction become even more important 
when thus applying the notion of corruption to living systems. Part of 
the justification of calling these changes in their functioning corrupt 
has been that they tend to destroy the living system. This would prevent 
evolution from being corrupt; a desirable outcome. A creature which
suffers a mutation departs from the sound state of its species. Often
it just dies as a result; there is neither corruption nor evolution.
If it survives and passes it to its descendents, they may degenerate if 
it is a harmful mutation but if there is no mechanism at work by which 
the whole species tends to take on the harmful mutation (as there was 
with my fowls) there will simply be degeneration of some members, not 
corruption. But if it is a profitable mutation it will not count as 
a corruption even though by natural selection the whole species may tend 
to exhibit it, for it enhances rather than damages the survival capacities 
of the species.
Corruption is, whatever else it is, a kind of deterioration, 
and extinction is the clearest kind of evil which may befall a creature 
or a species. Only man can make the judgment, on his own behalf and 
that of animals, that in som e circumstances it is better to die than 
live; no other creature can commit suicide, though they can kill themselves, 
But perhaps we may step a little beyond this unequivocal criterion and use 
the idea of impoverishment instead of that of extinction in order to 
justify an attribution of corruption. A living thing has a range of 
activities and abilities proper to it. If these are drastically reduced 
and restricted by some mechanism internal to the species we might say 
those creatures have been corrupted even though they are not likely to
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die. In this sense it might be suggested that we have corrupted various 
species by domesticating them. I do not know the facts of domestication, 
but it seems possible that hens’ ancestors could fly, and cows’ ancestors 
run fast. It is we who have brought about the impoverishment, but it can 
still be called corruption since it was done using the natural mating 
procedure of the species, manipulated for our purposes, and their feeding 
behaviour and so on. Until recently, men engineered which bull mated 
with which cow, but the beasts themselves did the actual mating. It may 
be that the fact that we have impaired these creatures’ capacity for 
survival without our assistance would form a ground for saying that we 
have corrupted them. But so also might the fact, if it is one, that their 
lives are now impoverished in comparison with the lives of their ancestors. 
On my account of corruption there can be no corrupt kind of 
thing as such. So it may be asked whether anything which is in a 
corrupt state must have once been in the sound state of its kind, or if 
things may come into existence already corrupt. This ia not a question 
about natural history but a conceptual question, for the following reason. 
We must have some justification for calling a certain object a corrupt #, 
rather than a perfectly good member of some other kind. The simplest way 
would be to say that it was once in the sound state for ys and has got by 
some traceable path from that state into the state of disintegration in 
which we find it. And the quotation from the OED with which I began 
suggests that this requirement, that an object in a corrupt state must 
have got into that state by a process of corruption from the sound state, 
is built into the concept of corruption. It says that to be corrupt is 
to be ’changed from the naturally sound condition’. In the case of 
inorganic stuff this requirement seems to hold good. If a - piece of 
metal were found which had all the properties of rusty tin but could be 
proved to have always been like that, it seems to me that we would say 
that a new kind of stuff had been found which was just like rusty tin.
For if the stuff is to W  tin, there must be some story about what has 
prevented it from being in the sound tin-state. If it has always been 
in this state-like-rusty-tin, the interference must have occurred before
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it came into existence. But if something happened at that stage to 
prevent whatever elements form sound tin from doing so, and instead 
something else happened, it seems as though some other kind of thing was 
formed; and if some other kind of thing then not tin and ipso facto not 
rusty tin.
But the case is different with organic material. It is 
different because inorganic material does not reproduce itself. Organic 
material on the other hand composes a living thing, which reproduces its 
kind by forming the beginnings of a new member of the kind from its own 
material. If the relevant bit of its own material is already corrupt, 
it could pass on the corruption and the new thing which grew would be 
made of corrupt material. This couldn’t happen if the relevant bit of 
material were completely corrupt (as completely as is compatible with 
existing as that kind of material at all); for I have said, surely 
correctly, that completely corrupt organic matter is unfit to sustain 
life, therefore not the new life of a new member of the species. The 
parent might lay an egg or drop a seed, but if these were quite corrupt 
they would rot away, not be a new living being. But there are many 
degrees of corruption. If some of the material were a bit corrupt, 
there might be the possibility of a new growth whose matter was to some 
extent corrupt from the beginning*
But though this answers in the negative the question whether 
every corrupt thing must once have been sound, this is because a new plant 
or animal is not created from nothing but receives matter from its parent. 
So the question is shifted back: must there have been soundness somewhere 
back in the line? To this the answer must be yes. Firstly, the corrupt 
material isn’t fit to sustain life, and it spreads, so this corruption 
cannot have been present long or the ’family' would have died out. More 
cogently, we require still, for anything which isn’t sound, a specific 
interference or diversion which has prevented it from being sound. If 
no such thing is forthcoming but we are told and asked to take seriously
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the claim that it has always been so, there is no ground for ascribing 
to the kind a sound state other than the one we find in the example, 
and this excludes the possibility of its being corrupt. Therefore it 
must be the case that for any corrupt thing, either it or its ancestor, 
if it is the kind of thing which has ancestors, was^ once sound.
I now summarise the conclusions of this chapter. The sound 
state for a member of a natural kind is the state it will be in if left 
to pursue the natural development of things of that kind. The concepts 
of soundness and natural development are connected with welfare: the 
sound state is that which allows an aniraad or plant to survive and to 
engage acj^ uately in the typical pursuits of things of that kind. The sound 
state has a special role in explanation. No explanation is usually 
required of why an Individual is in the sound state for its kind whereas 
it is required when an individual deviates from its sound state. This is 
because the sound state is the realisation of the natural tendencies of 
that kind of thing.
Corruption is disintegration maintained and spread by an 
internal process. It unfits its subject for its proper function and leads 
to extinction. It applies to stuff, especially to the decomposition of 
organic stuff. It also applies to living systems, when the system itself 
is turned from maintenance and survival to self-destruction. I suggested 
finally that an internally maintained process leading to impoverishment 
might count as corruption. A necessary condition for the attribution of 
corruption is that the corrupt thing or its ancestor was once sound.
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Chapter Two. Innocence
If we are to apply the concept of corruption to morality, we 
muat have some idea of the sound moral state. I shall begin by considering 
whether innocence may be the sound state with which we contrast moral 
corruption. We certainly speak of the corruption of innocence; and 
innocence is a state which people seem to start off in, both individuals 
and, according to the story, the ’race of men’ itself. It does, therefore, 
fulfil the rather tentative requirement that the sound state should 
actually precede the corrupt one. There is some reason to consider 
innocence as a possible sound state, for there has been a persistently 
recurring tradition which recommends it as the sound natural state of 
mankind, an ideal ’state of nature’ from which man descends into the 
corruption of civilization. This view would suggest that innocence is 
not only the state mankind and perhaps individual men were originally 
in, but that it is the natural state, in the sense noted earlier that 
they would remain in it if their natural development were pursued without 
interference, and that to leave the state of innocence is a corrupt 
departure from mankind's true nature.
The phrase ’corruption of innocence’ seems to suggest a corrupt 
version of some quality, innocence. I should explain that what I am here, 
as elsewhere, interested in is the corruption of a person - here, an 
innocent one. I consider innocence and corruption as two states which a 
person may be in; I do not consider the state of innocence in a pure form 
and in a corrupt form.
The sense of innocence I shall be concerned with is not that in 
which we say that a man is innocent of a certain deed. In this sense it 
means that a man has committed no legal or moral offense. The law is 
irrelevant here, and it would be vacuous for this enquiry to examine the 
sound state as that of not having committed a moral offense. No doubt 
this is very sound, but so far from providing a starting point for a
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moral enquiry, it requires that we first discover what a moral offense is.
I take the central feature of innocence to be the lack of 
acquaintance with evil. This may be either the lack of acquaintance with 
anything which is, in fact, evil, or the unawarenees, with respect to 
anything with which one is acquainted, that it is evil. A minor example. 
In L. P. Hartley’s ’Go Between’, the boy Leo questions Lord Tiimingham 
about the fifth Viscount, who died in a duel of jealousy concerning his 
wife. Leo says "Oh, what funi" and plies Triminghara with bright, 
interested questions (e.g. "Was he angry with her?"). He has no idea of 
the jealousy, hatred and betrayal involved. He is quite unacquainted with 
these passions, and therefore unaware of any evil in the story. In this 
way he is an innocent.
The acquaintance in question, as we may gather from the example, 
is not just a theoretical knowledge that certain things are evil. It is 
more like the knowledge involved in knowing or being acquainted with a 
person. I am acquainted with a person not just when I know who he is, 
but when I have met him or had some personal experience of him. The 
innocent does not understand wickedness, moral evil. He may know that 
there is wickedness in the world, because he has been told (as Leo knows, 
in an external and incomprehending way, that murder is evil). But he has 
no experience of evil motivations and desires in himself, and so cannot 
understand what it would be like to feel, e.g., jealous hatred, or to do 
murder. A whole dimension in which we see the world and understand the 
actions of others is lacking to him. This does not mean that he thinks 
that everyone acts from morally good motives; he has no understanding of 
moral assessment at all.
Innocence, then, is a negative moral quality, admirable for its 
absence of evil motivation, but making its possessors somewhat unrealistic, 
since they are ignorant of a certain genuine aspect of the actions of 
others. The attempt to elevate it into a virtue produces the more sickly 
and sentimental of Dickens’s heroines. It can be seen why it carries 
with it certain qualities such as trustingness and straightforwardness.
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An innocent will not be suspicious because he will not realise there is 
anything to be auspicious of. It is also clear in what sense children 
are innocent. It is not that they all possess some quality of glowing 
moral goodness. To think so is to sentimentalize childish innocence. 
Hartley’s portrait of Leo is a much truer description of childish 
innocence. Leo, to begin with, has no perception of the moral dimension 
of actions at all. He has a concept of ’right’ and 'wrong': there are 
in his life things-to-be-done and things-not-to-be-done. But these are 
seen in completely external, legalistic terras: "I felt sure that when a 
girl was engaged to a man she did not write letters to another man calling 
him ’darling*. She might do it until the day of the engagement but not 
after. It was automatic; it was a rule; like leaving the wicket at 
cricket when you were out; and it scarcely crossed my mind that to comply 
with it might be painful." (Penguin p.l56). Gradually Leo comes to a 
vague realisation of the moral dimension of what is going on: "For the 
first time in my life I had a strong sense of obligation in a matter 
that didn’t really concern me - a sense of ought and ought not .... But 
now for some such scruple I felt constrained to take preventive action - 
and at a sacrifice to myself." (p.182). This is the beginning of a loss 
of innocence: "Though I didn’t know the term’hush-money’, its meaning 
flittered, bat-like, about my mind." (p.194).
So the phrase ’unacquainted with evil’ carries with it not only 
ignorance but the idea of being untainted with evil, in a way in which 
someone, however upright in his behaviour, who is aware of his own and 
others’ complex desires and can see them as good and evil, and who 
accepts them as part of the world, is tainted with it. "I knew that 
(the letters) were very secret and aroused the strongest feelings - 
feelings which, until this afternoon, I had not known that grown-up 
people possessed, feelings which might lead - well, lead to murder."
It seems that of innocence, as of virginity, the loss is 
irrevocable. On a logical parallel with virginity, if at any time one 
becomes acquainted with evil, it will never again be true of one that
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one haa never been acquainted with it# But what ia the reality of this?
Let ua see what would be necessary for innocence to be regained.
First, one would have no longer to see or feel anything in
one’s present experience as evil. But in addition, one would have to
forget one’s past acquaintance. One nmst no longer see or feel anything 
in one’s past experience as evil, since this would be a present judgment 
and therefore a present acquaintance. We have seen that the innocent 
view is somewhat unrealistic, and lacks a dimension. Once one has seen 
the world in the fuller, non-innocent li^t, it is impossible to discard 
it. One may revise one’s judgnent of a particular event. One mi^t have 
believed that certain people were deceiving one or manipulating one, and 
later come to believe that this wasn’t the case. But this cannot return 
a person to a state of innocence, since deceit and manipulation remain 
in his battery of possible explanations of behaviour; they just don’t 
explain that behaviour.
The one possibility for regaining innocence seems to be amnesia. 
Since one cannot remember past events without remembering the light in 
which one saw and experienced them, perhaps a man can regain innocence 
by forgetting all the events of his life since he was last innocent.
(a possibility exploited by Graham Greene in ’Ministry of Fear’). But 
forgetting particular events would not be sufficient; it would be necessary 
also to forget the way of looking at the world which was involved in 
remembering them. As I put it earlier, it would be necessary to forget 
that certain explanations or descriptions of events and people were even 
available; one would have to lose the attitudes involved in using and 
understanding these explanations. This takes us from the knowledge a 
man possesses to his character. A man’s attitudes to the world and his 
way of understanding it form part of his character. If he is to regain 
innocence he must lost contact not only with that part of his life which 
wasn’t innocent, but also with a part of his character.
Character is something which is formed and changed continuously 
throughout a man’s life by his interaction with the world. I don’t
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want to argue that a man oannot lose port of his character in this way, 
that if he suffers a radical change of character he is a different person. 
But our moral interest centres on a man's conscious aims and purposes and 
their origin in one consciously continuous individual. Innocence, however, 
seems to he regained, if at all, by a kind of moral discontinuity. In 
typical amnesia stories the change is brought about by a bump on the head. 
Perhaps a man might be able to cause such a bump to be administered to 
himself in exactly the right spot and thereby regain innocence; but it 
would be a curious moral aim. It mi^t be possible to regain innocence 
other than by bumps on the head, but if I am ri^t as to what this project 
would require, what one could not do would be to conceive a deliberate 
project of regaining innocence and carry it through consciously in such 
a way that one could compare one's success at the end with one's state 
when one set out. For that would require remembering one's state when 
one set out as a state of oneself, and that would involve recognising the 
attitudes and explanations one had then as possible ways of seeing the 
world.
There can be such a thing as a moral project to change one's 
attitudes. Such a project is described by Iris Murdoch in her essay 
'The Idea of Perfection' (in 'The Sovereignty of Good'). A mother  ^
gradually changes her attitude to her daughter in law, thinking of her 
at first as silly and vulgar and finally as spontaneous and gay. It is 
an exercise of charity or justice ; it is continuous and at the end she 
can remember her former attitude and consider it imjust. On the other 
hand it is hard to see the regaining of innocence as I have described it, 
involving an abn^t discontinuity and the loss of contact with the point 
of departure, as having any moral relevance at all (though, as in the 
Greene story, it may bring peace of mind). The process may be irrelevant 
to personal identity, but it does seem to involve some loss of moral 
identity.
Innocence, then, is a lack of acquaintance with evil, involving 
both ignorance and an unrealistic or narrow view of the world. The
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innocent has no idea what certain attitudes would be like, and lacks 
a certain range of explanations* For moral purposes loss of innocence 
can be regarded as irrevocable.
What, then, is the corruption of innocence? We do regard 
innocence as particularly vulnerable, and it is easy to see why.
Innocence involves not knowing a very real aspect of the world; this 
doesn't amount to a false belief because the innocent lacks the under­
standing to have either a false or a true belief on the subject. But it 
resembles a false belief in being vulnerable to the truth. If the 
innocent comes into close contact with evil, it will tend to enforce 
recognition. If, being surrounded and closely touched by something evil, 
the innocent doesn't recognise it or notice it, we will be forced to call 
liim morally blind rather than innocent. If we try to represent innocence 
as a virtue of positive strength whose exercise consists (in part) in a 
refusal to z^ ecognise some evil which is under one's nose, we find 
ourselves with nothing more glorious than stupidity. We see this in 
Dickens's portrait of Tom Pinch in'Martin Chuzz^ lewit'. Nobody is taken 
in by the hypocrisy and evil designs of Pecksniff except Tom, his closest 
associate, and Dickens tries to present this as a consequence of his 
nobly simple and innocent nature. In fact, what we get is a picture of 
crass stupidity which does him no credit at all.'
Again, there is the absence of certain motivations and desires.
I first mentioned these as evil desires, but this is wrong. Many are 
adult passions which in certain circumstances may be evil. Part of Leo's 
innocence is his total lack of awareness of sexual passion; he has a 
natural contempt for 'spooning* because he doesn't suspect the existence 
of any strong passion which provides a good reason for this 'silly' 
activity. But if the absence of this kind of desire is involved in 
innocence, innocence will be vulnerable to the normal process of 
development, in most people.
However this vulnerability, as I have so far described it, makes 
a difficulty in saying what the corruption of innocence is. For clearly
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lo88 of Innocence is not in itself corrupt* It usually occurs as a 
normal part of growing up* Nor is it corrupt just to experience certain 
sorts of desires, e.g. sexual ones, at least if we can carry over my 
claim that there is no corrupt kind of thing; we are naturally subject 
to such desires. Yet equally obviously loss of innocence is a necessary
condition for the corruption of innocence; when innocence is corrupted
the subject does not retain innocence in some corrupted form, but loses 
it*
I suggest that the corruption of innocence is the loss of 
innocence in such a way that, as a consequence, one becomes morally
corrupt* I suggest, in fact, that there is not some special kind of
corruption which is the corruption of innocence* All innocence does is 
to depart; the corruption that arrives is a moral corruption which may 
follow other states than innocence* And this moral corruption must be 
contrasted with some other morally sound state than the state of innocence*
How can a person lose innocence in such a way as to become 
morally corrupt? I mentioned the vulnerability of innocence; it is 
vulnerable not only to loss but also to corruption* The innocent is 
vulnerable because he doesn't know what to avoid; not knowing what is 
dangerous he will have no suspicion and no protection. If, as his eyes 
are gradually opened, he has the firm foundation of finding that that 
part of the world with which he is involved and to which he is committed 
is on the whole all right, he will simply lose innocence* But if a 
person wakes to a knowledge of good and evil to find himself involved in' 
evil, or if he is given evil instead of good when he is still unable 
to judge between them, he may be corrupted* (He needn't be, as Henry 
James shows in 'What Maisie Knew')* To come to a first awareness of 
evil by realising that one is oneself involved with it is likely to be 
corrupting* The innocent is (i) likely to become involved in evil because 
he lacks the knowledge of it which would enable him to avoid it 
and (ii) likely to become morally corrupt through no fault of his own - 
it may be impossible to hold him responsible for his own corruption*
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Whereas we do In general hold ordinary moral agents responsible for 
their own corruption, since we believe they have that acquaintance with 
evil which would enable them to avoid it.
For example, we might take children 'educated* by some character 
like Fagin. Their education consists in being taught a skill, the skill 
at picking pockets. In the familiar way they are praised for excelling 
at it; in addition the adults who are held up to them as models of 
excellence (e.g. Bill Sykes) have a high degree of this skill.
Let us imagine a child naturally adventurous and idealistic.
It may seem glorious to him to undertake risky escapades; he may idealise 
Bill Sykes as the best there is. Suppose he then gradually comes to 
realise some things like the following; Bill Sykes takes things other 
people have a right to or value; his (the child's) love and admiration 
are made use of rather than returned in kind; Bill Sykes is a coward; 
as a result of his (child's) actions people who trust him are hurt - and 
so on. It may finally be no longer possible for him to regard the 
enterprise as glorious. The child's corruption may consist in his 
believing that this is in general what the world is like; he may become 
cynical; the best things in his world are rotten therefore any lesser 
thing will be more rotten therefore all is rotten. He may continue in 
corrupt ways thinking there is no other way to go on.
Or the story may run sli^tly differently. The children will 
want to value and be valued. They will pick up not only the criterion 
(success in stealing) but the tone of their elders' value-talk. The 
thing to be is clever and sly and crafty; such persons are the ones who 
excel in stealing. These children through imitation and the desire to 
be valued will form a conception of the good ' as something clever 
and sly and crafty, and as involving getting the better of people. They 
do admire something as constituting excellence, but it is something 
which is not in fact admirable. It will be practically impossible to 
detach, for such persons, the idea 'admirable and to be pursued' from 
the idea 'getting the better of people, crafty*. Yet how could they
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have avoided making that identification in the first place? In these 
cases, innocents come to an awareness of evil to find themselves involved 
in it, and may be unable to reject it when its nature dawns on them.
Innocence then is peculiarly vulnerable to corruption, but the 
corruption to which it is vulnerable is moral corruption, judged corrupt 
by reference to some other standard than innocence. Leo, for example, as 
the thou^t about hush-money comes to him (see pagel9), must enter the 
fray as a moral agent; once his world contains the possibility of such 
an institution as he has before him not the choice between
corruptly accepting (k' ^ ^ - and the sound innocent state of not
realising what it is, but between corruptly accepting it and soundly 
refusing it under that title. Once the innocent loses his innocence, he 
enters the world of morality, where the standard for his behaviour is 
no longer innocence but a fully moral sound state, which remains to be 
discussed.
But why won't innocence do as the sound moral state? One 
reason I have indicated already - it is lost as a part of normal develop­
ment. However, I haven't considered the possibility that the correct 
description of vdiat usually happens is that we all become corrupt.
Perhaps the original innocence of Adam and Eve is the proper and sound 
state for mankind, as some of those who object to civilization suggest.
The first thing which which would make innocence at least 
peculiar as the sound state is that it cannot be aimed at. Either one 
has it, or one has irrevocably lost it. And the innocent lacks even the 
knowledge which would enable him to preserve his condition. It can only 
be envied.
I would claim further that innocence cannot be thought of as 
worthy to be aimed at. To regard innocence as the proper human condition 
is to deny a large part of our capacities, to restrict both knowledge and 
our emotional natures. Consider the much maligned Eve. She was given 
a reason not to eat the apple, the reason of authority. Then the serpent
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tempts her, and she considers the matter for herself;
And when the woman saw that the tree was good for food, and 
that it was pleasant to the eyes, and a tree to be desired 
to make one wise, she took of the fruit thereof, and did eat#.
(Qenesis.III.6)
These are good reasons, and the last even a morally good one.
To take innocence as the sound state would be to accept something 
restricted as the human good. Had Eve insisted on remaining innocent, 
she would have been refusing to develop the capacity for knowledge. 
Innocence also involves the absence of certain passions; perhaps Eve 
lost her innocence by wanting the fruit and by reasoning about it at all. 
But the sound state must surely be some right adjustment of our whole 
nature, not the abandonment of some part of it.
It may be felt that I have ignored a powerful tradition, exem­
plified for example in Dostoyevsky's 'The Idiot', which takes innocence 
to be a supremely worthy ideal. I cannot do this tradition justice here, 
but there are reasons for thinking that it is anyway beyond the scope of 
a purely ethical investigation.
Prince Myshkin is a morally good person in a quite unmysterious 
way; kind, honest, courageous, generous, conscientious. Dostoyevsky 
seems to have thought of his innocence not as part of his virtue but as 
a personal characteristic which will make him a sympathetic hero (see 
Introduction to the Penguin translation). He is guileless and unsuspicious 
and lacks many of those passions (e.g. ambition, possessive love) which 
sometimes make men wish one another evil. But the most important reason 
why he wishes noone evil is not his innocence but his goodness - his love 
of the good and of his fellow men.
If Prince Hyahkin's innocence is to be taken as more than an 
endearing characteristic it must, I think, be seen as part of a religious 
ideal of purity. (As we see it, for example, in the Holy Man of Kipling's 
'Kim') Such purity has two major differences from the kind of innocence 
I have discussed; it is invulnerable, and it can be aimed at. Both 
these differences arise from the fact that the innocence is based on a
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religious view of the world which involves a kind of detachment from its 
hullabaloo* The innocence is invulnerable because based on a view of 
reality, rather than on ignorance; the same view of what kind of a place 
the world is enables the man who holds it to aim at and achieve innocence 
and look back upon his former state as benighted. But innocence of this 
sort is a religious ideal based on religious metaphysics; the reasons for 
taking it as a sound state must be religious rather than simply moral, 
and this takes it beyond my project. (Eve's behaviour looks quite 
different from a religious point of view; her fault was surely in dis­
obeying God, not in desiring wisdom. There is no reason to think that a 
morality based on religion will command the same things as one not so 
based).
According to my analysis of natural corruption, there can be 
no corrupt kind of thing; the sound state was part of the natural 
development of the appropriate kind. If the analogy with the natural can 
be carried through, we cannot accept innocence as the sound state since 
it would deny this development. And even if we accept the suggestion that 
there is some corruption, perhaps the result of original sin, in human 
nature itself, yet on the mundane plane of morality there is a great 
difference in point of corruption between some of us and others* This 
investigation concerns the ^ differences between David Copperfield and 
Uriah Keep which makes us call one corrupt and the other sound, and not 
any similarity between them. This difference remains to be accounted 
for by one who claims that innocence is the sound state and to depart 
from it a corruption.
t?
Chapter Three. Integrity
There are two ways in which we might locate the morally sound 
state. One is by treating the morally sound state as a special case of 
the naturally sound state. This must involve the assumption or claim 
that men are naturally good, and only become corrupt as a result of 
some alien interference with their natural course of development. This 
line of thought suggested innocence as a likely candidate for the sound 
state, as a good state which is natural to man and in which he would 
remain if his development pursued its proper course unhindered. But the 
attempt to take innocence as the sound state failed. This does not show 
that man is not naturally good, only that even if he is, innocence is not 
the state of natural goodness. There have been many other attempts to 
describe a state of moral goodness as the proper or natural development 
of a man's nature, and evil as an unnatural departure from it. But 
without a fair amount of metaphysics, more than I shall attempt here, we 
cannot identify the morally sound state with that state which a man would 
naturally develop into if left to himself - the formula that was used 
for the natural case. For, quite apart from the seeming impossibility of 
deciding what it would be for a man to be left to himself, there seems 
to be no particular moral state into which we might expect such a man to 
develop. Some crimes are certainly called unnatural, but on the whole 
these seem to be ones which indicate in the criminal a complete absence 
of some affection or sensibility which we call natural because we most of 
us share it and think it good. Murder of parents and torture of children 
are examples of suchRaturai crimes. But calling them unnatural seems 
not so much to contrast their moral wickedness with the naturally good 
condition of the rest of us as to indicate sunrise that anyone, whatever 
his moral state, should want to do such things. Most human beings don't 
happen to want to torture children. But if people can be said to be 
naturally disposed not to commit certain crimes, they also seem to be
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naturally subject to certain temptations. Pope Alexander Vi's gross 
nepotism in favour of children whom he had no business to have anyway 
may have been immoral and corrupt, but hardly seems unnatural* These 
rather idle reflections on our talk of what is natural show, if they 
show anything at all, that what we consider natural doesn't coincide 
at this level with what we consider morally good, nor the bad with 
the unnatural* To establish that the morally sound state is the natural 
or proper state for man requires a theory of human nature. The under­
taking seems to me a worthy one, but it is beyond my competence.
But there is another possibility: that both the naturally sound 
state and the morally sound state are discovered by reference to a 
further principle which governs both, though in different ways. My 
procedure in the natural case was to give reasons why we must think of 
a certain state as the standard or norm for judging things of the 
appropriate kind. In parallel fashion, I want now to argue that a 
certain attribute must at least form part of our moral norm or standard; 
we could not, I shall claim, adjudge to be a good man one who lacked this 
attribute. And thus that it is a vital ingredient of the sound moral state, 
Althou^ the reasons which we find for taking a certain state as the norm 
in the natural case may be quite different from those which we find to 
support our moral norm, we are in both cases searching for that without 
which we could not consider something a good example of its kind.
Any attribute of which this can be said will be an ingredient of the sound 
state. In the natural case, for example, survival capacities are relevant; 
but we are unlikely to find that people die of moral corruption. When I 
have established a certain state as morally sound, I shall use it to 
analyse moral corruption; finally I shall look for parallels between 
moral and natural corruption.
My candidate for the sound state this time is integrity. My 
discussion of innocence took up the connection between corruption and 
impurity; but in so far as purity could be accepted at all as the sound 
state, it seemed to be a religious rather than a moral aim. Now I
take up the association of corruption with disintegration and turn to 
the state of integrity which provides us with a metaphor of wholeness.
What then is integrity, and what is it a wholeness of? Integrity must 
apply to a man's character. But the investigation must start with what 
the man of integrity does. His character consists to a large extent of 
his inclinations to do and attitudes towards certain actions.
A first suggestion might be that to act with integrity is to
stick to or support one's values. As Gary Watgon argues in his paper
•Free Agency' (J.P.1975) there are for each of us certain things which
we value, judge to be worthwhile, good and worthy of pursuit, as
distinguished from the things we 'just' want. We judge the world and our 
own lives good in so far as they conform to these values, they give 
meaning and point to our lives and provide us with answers to the 
reflective questions we pose ourselves: what shall I do? what shall I be? 
Thus Father Sergius, in Tolstoy's story, values chastity. It is part of 
the ideal round which his life is built and if he gives in to the 
temptation presented by the strange lady, he will on this view lack 
integrity.
As it stands, this won't do. Consider the case of Cesare Borgia. 
He had, it might be said, one overwhelming value: to be a great prince.
This seemed to him the thing most worthy of pursuit and achievement; his 
life was built around it and was given its meaning for him by reference to 
it. But for him this value was so important that it wiped the floor with 
all other possible values, including - especially - integrity. His stand­
point is clear and simple and he consistently pursued his aim throu^ a 
career of deception, treachery and murder. It may not yet be clear what 
integrity is but it is quite clear that (a) Cesare Borgia consistently 
pursued what he held to be of value and (b) whatever integrity is he 
didn't have any. It cannot therefore consist in the single-minded pursuit 
of what one takes to be worthwhile.
A natural reaction to this case would be to attempt to disqualify 
anything like being a great prince' as the sort of value sticking to
which gives one integrity. Two things seem to be wrong with it. First 
it makes essential reference to him. He doesn't value anyone else being 
a great prince, in fact in some cases he sets considerable disvalue on it. 
He doesn't think a great prince is a good thing to have in the world if 
it isn't him. But we mi^t want to say that the sense of 'value' which 
we need here is that in which to value something is to judge it worthy of 
pursuit by anyone. Secondly, to hold this one single value by itself 
utterly disregards the good of anyone else, whether aiming at great 
princehood or not. Their physical, moral or emotional well-being or 
suffering are simply of no interest whatever.
Following this suggestion, we might take integrity to consist 
in upholding one's moral values, and use these two objections to restrict 
what is to count as a moral value, i.e. by stipulating that it must 
essentially contain no referring terms and should contain references to 
human good and harm. These of course aren't sufficient conditions since 
the following seems to satisfy them; that whoever is uttering this 
sentence should excel at grinding the faces of the poor. Yet we are 
unlikely to want to accept this as a moral value. But even if the 
restriction to the moral could be made precise along these lines, this 
fonaulation will not be acceptable. For taking something unequivocally 
moral, one can construct a case where a man fails to uphold his moral 
values yet doesn't fail in integrity. For example, the following. 
Generosity is clearly a moral value; any criterion for a moral value 
which excluded generosity would be unacceptable on that account. Imagine 
then a man who values generosity. On some particular occasion - say, 
a person in distress knocking on his door at midni^t - he not cmly 
believes he ou^t to act generously but is also quite clear what generosity 
requires that he do. At a minimum, let us say, open the door. He doesn't 
open the door. He is certainly open to criticism, but to accuse him of 
lack of integrity doesn't seem to hit the mark. Yet he does act against 
his moral belief, stemming from his attitude to generosity, concerning 
what should be done in this situation. Integrity therefore , cannot
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oonsiat in upholding one's morel values*
How does an exercise ^ of generosity differ from a display of 
integrity? The proper reaction to generosity is gratitude; but gratitude 
doesn't seem applicable to integrity* One may feel gratitude towards one 
who displays integrity if his act benefits oneself# For instance, when a 
man under oath tells in evidence the truth which clears another of a crime, 
the innocent man may feel grateful to him. Nevertheless, it would be 
proper for the witness to repudiate the gratitude as inappropriate, saying:
I only did what was required. Can we alter my earlier case of lack of 
generosity so that it becomes a lack of integrity? Yea: in troubled times 
a man undertakes a dangerous journey and his friend undertakes to give him 
shelter at the end of it. The traveller arrives and knocks; the friend 
doesn't open. The traveller falls therefore into the hands of enemies.
The fate of the traveller is not strictly relevant; it merely shows why 
the friend's failure matters. What makes this a case of lack of integrity 
is that the friend had undertaken to open the door and the traveller was 
relying on h^ im. Likewise the man on oath had undertaken to tell the truth. 
Gratitude is for favours; to carry out an undertaking is not to do a favour. 
Undertaking to open the door or tell the truth in the first place may be 
a favour and deserving of gratitude. But to carry out what has been under­
taken is not a favour but required. I suggest that integrity consists in 
the honouring of commitments.
Well, it say be said, wasn't Borgia committed to becoming a great 
prince? How does this get us any further? Let me specify what commitments
relevant to Integrity.
There are, I think, three kinds. First, specific, explicitly 
undertaken commitments. These don't need much comment. Promises, oaths, 
marriage contracts, business contracts. If promises are to include 
informal undertakings (e.g. "Will you come?" "Yes, all right. I'll be 
there.") there may sometimes be difficulties in deciding whether there is 
an undertaking or not. For example, take the man who says to his friend, 
"I'm going that way tomorrow anyway, I'll give you a lift", and then has
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a very good reaoon for going another way or staying at home* Has he 
promised or undertaken to be there (the man may be relying on him) or only 
offered a prediction? I ignore these problems, and include only clear 
cases of commitments, where someone has by words or signs undertaken to 
do something, that is, not just predicted that he will do it from knowledge 
of his plans and circumstances but explicitly formed a new intention or 
ratified an old one and provided himself with a reason for doing it which 
he did not have before* The man of integrity, then,keeps his word in 
these matters* This, 1 think, is a better explanation of the case of 
Father Sergius than that offered earlier. He had taken a vow of chastity.
To succumb to temptation would have been to break his vow and it is for this 
reason that it would have constituted a lack of integrity.
But this isn't enough. The man of integrity is also not, e.g. a 
liar, whether on oath or not; but when did he undertake to tell the tfuth?
Or consider the case of a man who complies with the McCarthy Committee 
demand that he give names of those among his friends who are or have been 
communists. The man of integrity does not provide evidence, whether true 
or false, to the persecutors of his friend. Yet he is unlikely to have 
promised not to do so, and probably will have made no expYcit promise' not
to betray his friend nor damage his interests. It seems that we may find
ourselves with commitments which have not been explicitly undertaken.
There is an answer to the question: when have I undez*taken to 
speak the truth? In an exaggerated form, it is: whenever you open your 
mouth. When we communicate with others, we say what we say as true. We 
cannot assert something without committing ourselves to the truth of what 
we say. If we use one of the many ways of cancelling the assumption that 
we are offering what we say as true (of which "I don't vouch for the truth 
of this" is only the most explicit and cumbersome) we are in virtue of this
*Mote: it is interesting that while from the point of view of justice it
makes a considerable difference whether the evidence is true or false -
an unjust law may be applied justly or unjustly - it makes no difference 
from the point of view of loyalty. In this case it is just as much a be­
trayal to say truly that one's friend has been a communist as to say it 
falsely.
no longer asserting it, no longer telling anyone anything. More accurately, 
we may be telling our hearer something else, for instance that this is what 
someone else thinks, but we aire not telling him that which we don't vouch 
for the truth of. It is not, itself,offered as information. The liar is 
always failing to honour his commitment to the truth of what he says, 
otherwise he wouldn't be lying, lying relies on the fact that what is 
asserted is offered as true. The practice of children and law courts of 
demanding, on solemn occasions, oaths that one will speak the truth doesn't 
Indicate that they believe there to be no prior commitment, but rather a 
belief that in certain pressing circumstances people aren't going to keep 
it without the extra threat of imprisonment for perjury or (in the case of 
children) the fulfilment of the various hypothetical maledictions. The 
'man of honour' rejects the suggestion that he should provide any extra 
commitment, holding rightly that he is already fully committed to telling 
the truth; 'my word is ay bond' says how things are. Children have a device 
crossing their fingers behind their backs - by which they reckon to cancel 
the claim that their words are true without anybody knowing. But of course 
this is a device for lying; the crossing out is to be secret but the claim 
to truth is contained in the statement itself. If one were really to cancel 
the truth-commitment, the other would have no reason to believe one's words. 
If one could cancel the assertive force of all one's utterances, the effect 
would not be that one could lie with impunity but that one ceased to 
communicate.
Tb±a is certainly oversioQïlified. Much information can be 
extracted from the statements of someone assumed to be lying if he is taken 
to be lying for a purpose and not at random, and governments are no doubt 
adept at using this foot to convey one thing in words saying the opposite. 
And one who answers the question "Do you know Jocelyn Jones?" by saying 
"No, I have never heard of that low-down skiving blackleg bitch in my 
life" cannot be said to have done much damage to the communicative possi­
bilities by his lie. Nevertheless the situation is basically as 1 have 
said: a statement , is offered as true and standardly implicates that one
believes that what one aaya is true. A lie fails to keep this standard 
commitment.
Loyalty is problematic. There have been in the past and to a 
lesser extent still are ea^ licit loyalty structures, such as mediaeval 
oaths of fealty, where it is made ejqplicit that a loyalty relationship is 
thereby entered into and what it commits the parties to. And there are 
also relationships whose terms, though not made explicit, are so widely 
known and accepted in a community that members of that c<xamunity who 
enter into the relationship with one another can clearly be held to have 
undertaken explicit commitments. For example, an Australian who becomes 
the 'mate* of another is, I believe, committed among other things to 
supporting his mate in any fight he gets into however ridiculous or 
unjustly provoked. The commitment is attached to the role quite overtly. 
But although ordinary friendship commits one to something, it is not very 
clear what, or where one's commitment begins and ends. And it seems that 
in contemplating some > course of action one can find oneself with a 
commitment one didn't realise one had; one can discover that some course 
of acticm would be disloyal. Finally, an act of loyalty can advance a 
friendship, make it closer or more binding than, It had been. A man who 
stands by his friend at great risk to himself loay make the friendship 
something it wasn't before, and not just carry out something to which he 
was previously committed. These reflections undermine the plausibility of 
considering loyalty as the fulfilling of an unexplicit commitment, and 
indeed of the existence of such things. But the man of integrity is 
surely loyal. So perhaps my claim that integrity is the keeping of 
commitments will have to be abandoned.
But it seems to me that in spite of these difficulties we must 
interpret loyalty as the keeping of a commitment even where the 'terms 
and conditions' of the friendship are left vague. For what does the man 
who discovers some proposed act to be disloyal discover? What could he 
discover except that it contravenes some comnitment which he takes himself 
to have to his friend. The vagueness of a commitment is no argument
34
against its existence, and accounts for the fact that it may not be 
immediately obvious to a man what it involves in some unforeseen situation. 
As for the final case, where an act of loyalty advances a friendship, 
there are several possibilities. It may not be loyalty, but a favour. It 
may be a discovery that the past nature of the friendship does, in fact, 
constitute a commitment to act in a way which hadn't occurred to one* Or 
perhaps in a case of loyalty at great personal risk, it may be the carrying 
out of an admitted commitment in circumstances so unforeseen that one would 
certainly have been iimediately forgiven for breaking it, or released from 
it on request. But the commitment interpretation can be upheld. This is 
a very sketchy discussion, but my primary concern is not with loyalty.
I cannot here give a very convincing account of what the commitment might 
bet seeking one's friend's good, or protecting such of his interests as 
are in one's hands, would have to be offered, and these are really blanket 
phrases. This is because the particular development of each friendship 
interprets this for the people involved in a great variety of ways, and 
what loyalty amounts to will be different in each case.
Thirdly, there is commitment to one's values. To be relevant 
to integrity these must be not just aims pursued for one's own satisfaction 
but aims thought of as worthwhile for anyone to pursue. They are thought 
of as goods in general, not just for oneself; anyone would be ri^t to 
value then. They are thought of as defensible and the sort of thing that 
could be validated by others. To be committed to a value is not just to 
think it good or valuable but to resolve to embody it in one's life or 
further it by one's activities because of its worth. We don't commit 
ourselves to all the things we think of as worthwhile; one may think it 
of great value to be a surgeon without having the slightest intention of 
becoming one. But one who decides that the most worthwhile thing he can 
do with his life or some slice of it is x, lacks integrity if he fails 
to pursue that course and especially if he pretends to pursue it and 
doesn't. Unless, that is, he changes his mind about its value.
But If a man is to have acted with integrity, it surely is not
®'^ F^icient that he is in fact keeping a commitment* We need some
condition about how he sees the matter# Suppose, to return to the law 
court, that a man under oath gives the evidence which clears the 
innocent man not because he is bound to do so but out of generosity to 
the man, or even malice towards azmther whom his evidence implicates*
That is to say, he wouldn't keep the commitment just because it is a
commitment, but he does in fact keep it because he has another reason for
doing so* Has he acted with integrity? Let us make a distinction between 
an act of integrity and a man of integrity# We may allow that the act 
is one of integrity since he does what he has undertaken to do; but it 
doesn't show him to be a man of integrity because it gives us no reason 
to think he will in general keep commitments# The man of integrity is one 
who had a certain attitude towards commitments* He personally accepts 
them as binding on him, and regards having a commitment as a sufficient 
reason for keepingit# A man of integrity then will be a man who not only 
performs acts of integrity but who does so because that is what they are* 
Thus a man who always in fact keeps his commitments because on each 
occasion it is profitable to do so or he fears the consequences of not 
doing 80 %fill perform many acts of integrity without being a man of 
integrity# He lacks the required general attitude#
But what of the man who keeps a commitment by mistake? Someone 
might set out to break a commitment and in fact do what fulfils it by 
mistake. We need a alight amendment % an act of Integrity is an intentiœial 
keeping of a commitment, thouf^  it need not be done because it is a keeping
of a commitment. Also 1 should add that
CL man does not lack integrity if he
fails to keep his commitment because hehhas broken his leg, though he may 
do 80 if the disability which prevents him is his o%m fault. If a man is 
to be said to have lacked integrity, it must have been possible for him to 
keep his commitment.
17
Someone may object that Judas undertook a commitment to the 
^^ hief Priests and kept it to the letter, but that this was hardly an 
act of integrity. The solution must lie in the fact that Judas had a 
prior commitment of friendship or disciplehood to Jesus. He broke this 
commitment by agreeing to betray Jesus in the first place. We still 
judge that he commits a further breach of integrity by actually betraying 
Jesus and, though nothing could alter his previous lapse, wcHild have 
retained more integrity had he refrained from doing so. There are grounds 
for saying that his agreement with the Chief Priests was invalid, because 
it was a corrupt commitment: a commitment to break a commitment. It might 
also have some weight towards invalidating the commitment in this case 
that his commitment to Jesus is prior to his commitment to the Chief 
Priests. But this need not be so. In Sophocles's 'Philoctetes', 
Neoptolemus makes a commitment to Odysseus to win and betray the trust of 
Philoctetes before he acquires any commitment to Philoctetes. Yet the 
first is the immoral commitment and it doesn't prevent him from acquiring 
real obligations to Philoctetes when he wins his confidence. It does 
show lack of integrity to take on what I have called a corrupt commitment, 
but a person who has done so may still ask which of the alternatives of 
breaking or keeping it most accords with integrity. We may, I think, 
conclude from this that integrity requires a man to keep his commitment 
unless that commitment is corrupt (is a commitment to break a commitment).
There may also be conflict of commitments neither of which is 
corrupt or ioooral. Does a man of goodwill who finds himself with two 
conflicting conmdtments lack integrity in failing to keep one of them?
He acts with integrity with respect to one of them; does he lack integrity 
with respect to the other? I suggest the following conditions under which 
in a case of conflict a man doesn't lack integrity in failing to keep one 
of the two conflicting commitments: where he concludes in good faith and 
with justification that one is more binding than the other and for that 
r«a8on keeps it. Thus lydgete concludes at the end of 'Middlanarch' that
il
hie commitment to the happiness of his wife Rosalind takes precedence 
over his personal commitment to pursue medical research, and this is 
a conclusion we can respect. He acts with integrity in fulfilling his 
commitment to Rosalind. He doesn't display integrity in abandoning 
his commitment to medical research, but he doesn't lack integrity either.
This allows me to qualify my fierce earlier claim that there is 
always a strict obligation to tell the truth. Intuition suggests that 
there are situations where one is obliged to tell a lie. Sometimes this 
is a choice of two evils, but sometimes a lie may be a good action# In 
'David Copperfield' Betsy Trotwood's fortune has been lost by, she thinks. 
Hr. Wickfield, to whom it was entrusted. She tells his daughter Agnes 
that she lost it herself in order to spare the girl distress and out of 
loyalty to her old friend. We can acquit this generous act of lack of 
integrity on the grounds that a more binding commitment of loyalty, or 
more serious moral consideration, requires the lie. (It is a comparative 
matter. The lie in this case is trivial compared with the misery the 
truth would cause her friend). I shall have more to say in the next 
chapter concerning the overriding of commitments.
Why should we take integrity to be an essential ingredient of 
the sound moral state, something without which a man cannot be thou^t of
as good? I offer four considerations*
There is, first, the social case. I shall not make this case in 
detail . Integrity makes trust possible, and lack of integrity destroys 
trust. Society wox^ cs by mutual co-operation. Bargains require confidence 
by each party that the other will do his part. There is more chance for
people to flourish when they are not having to defend what they have, but
can combine in undertakings and share resources. Trust is needed in 
public officials if there is to be good social order. Integrity is of
great social use.
This procedure for recommending integrity may be objected to.
First, it may be said, integrity is not necessaiy to social order and
4-0
and co-operation. Uobbea indeed tried to establish these in spite of 
an assumption that nobody was to be trusted, using self-interest and 
coercion. Secondly, it may be complained that the commitment-keeping 
behaviour recommended here is recommended solely on grounds of self- 
interest, and therefore doesn't amount to integrity, which requires 
commitment-keeping whether or not this is in one's interests.
The following may be said for the social approach. We, meaning 
ordinary members of society, could hardly regard as good a man who lacked 
integrity and was willing to betray our trust and damage our interests. 
Furthermore we are likely to value him who has integrity and will keep 
commitments whether it suits him or not. Integrity may not be necessary 
to society, but since the mechanism of self-interest and coercion is run 
at some cost to get people to keep commitments, we are likely to value the 
mam who does it without being made to. But this evazluation does rest 
entirely on the usefulness of the man of integrity to us, amd the damage 
done to us by his opposite. And if asked why the man/is useful to us 
should be considered morally good, we should perhaps have the grace to 
blush and be silent, or include on a plea of fairness the butcher, the 
baker and the candlestick maker.
A second consideration is as follows. Not only is trust an 
instrument for securing certain goods, but it is itself an essential part 
of certain other goods. There are relationships of which trust forms 
an integral part; without trust they do not exist at all. Chief among 
these is friendship. A schoolgirl may say, "If you don't trust me I won't 
be your friend", as if this were parallel to, "If you don't lend me your 
pen I won't walk to church with you". But without trust there is no 
friendship; the relation between trust and friendship is neither optional 
nor consequential. As to love, there are differing opinions as to whether 
it essentially involves trust. Many Biglish novelists present it as doing 
8 0, where it is a relationship between two people rather than a feeling 
which one person has for another. Proust however doesn't seem to think 
love between man and woman has much place for trust; but Proust also
seems to regard love as something of an affliction, and to value friendship 
more highly. Finally there are more restricted trust-relationshlps, such 
as that between professional partners or colleagues in a common enterprise. 
All these relationships involve trust because in them two or more people 
share at least a part of their lives. Friends and lovers have common 
enterprises and share values; each shares with the other the things which 
matter to him and each accepts the other's values and enterprises as his 
own or as having a claim on his care. Partners and colleagues, if their 
relationship is one of personal trust, see themselves as shazdng a 
worthwhile goal; each sees the other's efforts as to be assisted and 
protected rather than undermined and damaged because they are directed 
to the same good end as gives point to his own. All these relationships 
require trust, which in turn must be based on Integrity.
Thirdly, we may try to link the keeping of commitments with 
the pursuit of something thought of as worthwhile - holding something to 
be of value, in my earlier sense. To think of something as a worthy 
object of pursuit is to think of it as defensible to others. One may 
never actually defend or even explain it to anyone else; one may believe 
truly that nobody else actually does agree with one about its value.
But to think of it as defensible is to think of the judgment of others as 
having a certain significance in relation to it. To take an example of 
such a value, St. Francis regarded poverty as a state in which it would 
be good for anyone to live, and as something which anyone could and should 
value. He thought of it as something in respect of which he could show 
reason why others should value it. To think of it as defensible in this 
way is to think of it as presented to the judgment of others. If one 
has such a value, one must think of oneself as living in a world qf other 
people who make judgments, who themselves value things, and whose judgments 
and values matter.
But to lack integrity, not just in occasional actions but as a 
characteristic, is to break commitments when it suits one, to betray trust. 
This denies any importance to what matters to other people. The man who
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lacks integrity may think of himself aa living in a world of other men, 
but he doesn't think of them as creatures who make,judgnents and have a 
point of view - or he doesn't regard this characteristic as having any 
importance for him. To keep commitments because they are commitments 
is to allow some weight to the trust which others put in one, to take 
account of them as having a point of view, concerns which matter to them, 
and values. To keep commitments only if it suits one is to regard others 
only as objects which may impede one or make trouble for one if one doesn't* 
Thus a man who lacks integrity lacks an attitude to others which 
is necessary for anyone who is to have a value, or pursue something thought 
of as worthwhile. He who has this kind of value, therefore, must have 
integrity*
Fourthly, there is a tradition of regarding integrity as a matter 
of personal honour. I mentioned the man whose word is his bond; here is 
a nineteenth century young lady on her high horse: "Thank you from the 
bottom of my heart for believing me incapable of demeaning myself by 
telling lies". (Dostoyevsky. %e Idiot). She is a little comical, but 
the thought is that integrity is of personal value to her. She doesn't 
think of the social value of integrity but of how dishonourable it would 
be for her to lack it. It seems to be for its own sake a good state for 
a person to be in.
We must beware of a mistake here, one pointed out by George 
Eliot in 'Middleaarch'. Fred Vincy has got Caleb Garth to guarantee a 
debt which he is then unable to meet. He comes to confess to the Garths, 
feeling very bad. But he feels bad because his honour is damaged; what 
bothers him is that he will be lowered in their estimation, not that they 
will suffer. It hasn't occurred to him that the reason why it is dis­
honourable to lack integrity is that it damages those who trust one.
George Eliot says:
"Indeed, we are most of us brought up in the notion that the 
highest motive for not doing a %frong is something irrespective 
of the beings who would suffer the wrong.".
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There oust be a reason why integrity is made a part of personal 
honour, if this honour is to have any moral significance instead of being 
merely decorative- The reason lies in its usefulness to others* I said 
that we would be likely to value the man of integrity as socially useful 
but that this valuation was dubiously moral. But the person concerned 
with his honour is one who wants to think of himself as good. He doesn't 
want to be a man who preys on others or achieves his wellbeing at their 
expense; he wants them to be able to rely on him and trust him and he 
wants such trust and reliance to be justified. For the latter he needs 
integrity.
So far my case isn't made. Of the four considerations advanced, 
the first didn't seem to provide a reason for taking integrity to be part 
of the morally sound state. Concerning the other three, I have been trying 
to show that there are three goods, friendship, having values and personal 
honour, for which integrity is a necessary condition. But why should we 
take to be morally sound the man who wants or has these three goods?
If we are to think of a man as good, he must be trying to live 
a life which he thinks of as worthwhile. Our moral interest in the good 
man and kis life is an interest in how to be and how to conduct ourselves. 
The good man's life is not of moral interest as a series of events, it 
is of interest as a life conducted from his point of view. If a man is 
not even concerned with what is worthwhile there is no reason why his 
life as conducted by his from his point of view should have any moral hold 
on us. We cannot think of him as good unless he is concerned with living 
a life which he takes to be worthwhile.
I have argued straightforwardly that to have values is to try 
to live a life thou^t of as worthwhile and that integrity is necessary 
for this. In addition, a worthwhile life mi^t well be thought to involve 
personal honour, friendship and love. The case for personal honour may 
be part of the claim about the necessity to live a life thought of as 
worthwhile. It seems to boil down to a claim that a man needs integrity 
if he is to be able to think of himself as good. The claim that friendship
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must form part of a worthwhile life seems more dubious. I can't argue 
the case for friendship here. Perhaps it might be more plausible to say 
that since friendship is undeniably ^  good, a man who disqualifies himself 
for friendship cannot be a good man. But since integrity is necessary for 
each of friendship and love, personal honour, and having values, my claim 
that at least one of these is necessary to a worthwhile life will 
ensure that we cannot think of a man as good who lacks integrity, and 
therefore that it forms a necessary part of the sound moral state.
Of course, anyone who is uninterested in living a worthwhile 
life or being a good man will be untouched by anything I have said. I 
am not out to convince the amoralist; but what he decides to do makes no 
difference to what the sound state is.
I conclude with a quotation which shows the value which may be 
set on integrity by one who is interested in living a worthwhile life.
It is part of Bruno Bettelheim's reflections on life in a concentration 
camp.
'To survive as a man, not a walking corpse, as a debased and 
degraded but still human being, one had first and foremost to 
remain informed and aware of what made up one's personal point 
of no return beyond which one would never, under any circumstances, 
give in to the oppressor, even if it meant risking and losing one's 
life. It meant being aware that if one survived at the price of 
over-reaching this point one would be holding on to a life that 
had lost all meaning. It would mean surviving - not with 
lowered self-respect, but without any ...
Second in importance was keeping oneself informed of how one felt 
about complying when the ultimate decision as to where to stand 
firm was not called into question ... One had to comply with 
debasing and amoral commands if one wished to survive, but one 
had to remain cognizant that one's reason for complying was 
"to remain alive and unchanged as a person". Therefore, one had 
to decide, for any given action, whether it was truly necessary 
for one's safety or that of others, and whether committing it 
was good, neutral or bad..."
Bettelheim is not claiming that one can preserve one's Integrity 
completely, but here the attachment to minimal moral values is what holds 
the man together. Minimal integrity is more important than life because 
without it life wouldn't be worth living. Even, he suggests, there 
wouldn't be him left to live it. This is because there is a close 
connection between thinking of oneself as a person with a particular
oharaoter who continues over time, and making judgments concerning what 
is good. In trying to embody values in one's life, to take thou^t for 
what is good and valuable and direct one's life accordingly, one acquires 
a standpoint in the world; a position from which one judges it. To 
abandon integrity aü.together is to abandon this position, which is what 
gives one a unity. Bettelheim clings to the remains of directing his 
life according to judgments of what is good. Ho considers what would 
be too great a violation of his commitment to things he values for him 
ever to direct his life by them again. To commit oneself is to attach a 
part of oneself to that to which one is committed; if one breaks the 
commitment one abamdons this part.
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Chapter Four Moral Corruption
Corruption ia often contrasted with integrity; by taking integrity 
as the sound state - rather, as essential to the sound state - we may hope 
to gain some insight into corruption. But so far it is quite unclear 
just how corruption is opposed to integrity. I shall be looking for 
sufficient conditions for the ascription of corruption to a person or an 
action; I make no claim that they are also necessary.
To start with a rather obvious point: absence of integrity can't 
be a sufficient condition for corr uption. For if integrity is the 
honouring of commitments, then one who has no commitments has no integrity. 
Yet while there may be moral criticism to make of one who avoids commitments, 
corruption is not the right thing to accuse him of. He is not a candidate 
for either integrity or corruption. This of course applies only to the 
person who actually doesn't have any commitments, not to him who refuses 
to recognise commitments which he has. And this point is rendered somewhat 
academic by my earlier claim that there are some commitments (e.g. loyalty, 
honesty) which bind all who are not dumb or isolated. Nevertheless since 
this is an academic exercise I make it, for what it's worth: Robinson 
Crusoe, though meet for various kinds of moral assessment (e.g. sloth/ 
industry, courage/cowardice, pride/humility) is without integrity and also 
without corruption, if we ignore the possibility of commitments (a) to god 
and (b) to, say, his family, that he attempt to return to civilization.
(There may also be commitment to his own personal ideals). Absence of 
integrity, then, is not sufficient for corruption. Integrity and corrup­
tion are both applicable only to people who have commitments.
I will henceforth use the phrase 'lack of integrity* to apply 
only to those who, having commitments, fail to keep them, and ignore those 
who have no commitments. The corrupt are to be found among the ranks of 
those who lack integrity. But not all those who lack integrity are corrupt. 
For example, the simple akratic. Someone who loses his nerve in a crisis
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is not corrupt* For example, one who is intimidated and harassed in 
the hysterical atmosphere of the McCarthy committee into betraying his 
friends has not acted with integrity, but isn't corrupt* (If ho sets 
about deceiving himself about his motives or claiming that he was justified 
corruption may be setting in, but this is looking ahead)* Aristotle 
defends his claim that the akratic is not so bad as the vicious man by 
pointing out that the akratic will repent and that 'the best thing in him, 
the first principle, is preserved'. He is *a man whom passion masters so 
that he does not act according to the right rule, but does not master to 
the extent of making him ready to believe that he ought to pursue such 
pleasures without reserve'• (Nic*Eth*VII.8)* I restrict myself to 
commitment-keeping so that for my purposes the 'first principle' should 
be his recognition that the commitments is binding; also I include, 
unlike Aristotle, such things as anger, fear, jealousy and perhaps sloth 
as well as greed and lust as interfering factors* (He does include anger, 
with large reservations)* But the kind of case I mean is that where an 
agent is temporarily 'overcome' by some passion (can one suffer an attack 
of sloth in this way?) and fails to honour a commitment* He doesn't 
endorse his action as a good or permissible one, he doesn't act from 
choice, in the Aristotelian sense; he does not carry out the conclusion 
of a deliberation about what it is best to do* We would, I think, be 
unwilling to call corrupt a man whose 'heart is in the right place', 
thou^ he certainly lacks integrity in failing to keep his commitments*
This is even true of the confirmed akratic, the man who fails 
again and again* Corruption is not simply a matter of time, or of the 
number of failures of integrity* The difficulty with the confirmed 
akratic is to make him convincing; he must be a man who over and over 
again accepts a commitment and intends to fulfil it, over and over again 
gives in to temptation and fails to do so, and over and over again repents. 
There is some difficulty in believing that he really means it, that his 
cownitment and his repentance are sincere. But people addicted to something 
seem a clear example of this state. One can't intend what one takes to
be impossible; and the man of integrity doesn't undertake ccmanitments 
which he knows he can't fulfil. But there is a great difference between 
taking something to be absolutely impossible and taking it to be very 
difficult, and between absolute certainty that it can't be done and a 
high degree of doubt. Consider an experienced mountain climber who under­
takes a climb knowing that it will be very difficult and that he is unlikely 
to succeed; nevertheless he can set out intending to succeed. The case I 
am considering is the same as this one, except that the obstacle lies in 
the man's own nature. To adapt the example, the climber may know that the 
main obstacle to success is that he will get vertigo half way up. He 
can set out with the determination to overcome this obstacle in the same 
way as he sets out to overcome natural obstacles. So far from being 
corrupt, it seems a kind of saintliness to set out again and again to 
overcome some besetting temptation (though as for commitments, there is 
sMnething wrong with makingttoo much of other people's welfare depend 
on unlikely success); yet if it is a temptation which leads one to fail 
in one's commitments there is•considerable lack of integrity.
What, in addition to lack of integrity, characterises the
corrupt man? What is it about the akratic's repentance and preservation
of his 'first principle' which acquits him of this charge? He refuses to
accept his lack of integrity; corruption on the other hand seems to
involve the acceptance of lack of integrity as part of one's life. Of
course, the akratic doesn't refuse to accept in the sense of deceiving
himself that he is a person of integrity. He refuses to accept in so far
as he continues to decide and choose to keep commitments. He still
considers having made a commitment to be a sufficient reason for keeping
it, though he often doesn't manage to keep it. We have, then, the following;
Man of integrity (a) considers having a commitment a sufficient reason
for keeping it.
(b) does keep it.
Akratic (a) considers having a commitment a sufficient reason
for keeping it.
(b) doesn't keep it.
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Corrupt «an (a) doaan't consider having a commitment a sufficient
reason for keeping it.
(b) doesn't keep it.
A corrupt action is one which displays lack of integrity and 
which proceeds from a deliberate choice not to keep a commitment. The 
failure must, of course, be intentional; mistakes of fact such that a 
man doesn't know he is breaking a commitment absolve a man from the 
charge of corruption, though we need a caveat about avoidance of 
knowledge: the man who avoids knowing what hie commitments are or 
whether the situation is one which might require action may also be 
corrupt. The action is corrupt because it shows the agent to be corrupt.
It shows the aigent to be corrupt in that he doesn't accept the commitment 
as being a sufficient reason for acting. So Odysseus displays his attitude 
to undertakings when he urges Neoptolemus to trick and betray Philoctetes:
You see why you can safely deal with him
When I cannot? Because you will be trusted.
Some other time 
We will prove that we are honest, but today 
Let me persuade you to give up your scruples 
A little while, and then forever after
You can be called the noblest of mankind. (tr. T.H# Banks). 
This must be qualified to take account of my discussion on 
conflicting commitments. A man may not be able to preserve integidty 
if he undertakes in all good faith two equally binding commitments which 
turn out to conflict but it is going a bit far to call him corrupt. So 
we must add* unless there is some conflicting commitment of equal or 
greater weight which he judges is the one to keep. (A test of his 
sincerity may be his readiness to make amends as far as possible; but 
in many and often the most serious cases this isn't possible). This 
seems right; yet there may be some cases where two commitments of such 
fundamental importance clash that one can't avoid corruption. For some, 
the entry of their country into an unjust war may provide such a dilemma 
especially at the point where the country is likely to be invaded; for 
others it might be wickedness in someone to whom they have deep ties 
(should the wife of, say, the Cambridge Rapist have given him up to
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the police if ahe knew? What of a member of the résistance married to 
a collaborator?) Either way treachery may be involved and I am inclined 
to think that treachery is so gross a breach of commitment sis to be
always corrupt. I shall have more to say about the possible inevitability
of corruption, and about degrees of corruption.
But my formula captures the standard and central cases of 
corruption, e.g. where a judge accepts a bribe to acquit an accused person. 
He chooses to abandon his commitment to justice as embodied in local legal 
procedures (given that he believes them to be reasonably just); he doesn't 
consider this commitment a sufficient reason for upholding justice in this
case and this gives some less strong evidence concerning how he regards
commitments in general. He may have given in to a particular temptation, 
have repented of it, and never done it again. Nevertheless his action 
was a corrupt one and he was at the time of doing it to th some extent 
corrupt.
What about the man who chooses to break his commitment but 
doesn't carry out his decision? Must one act to be corrupt? This is 
the fourth combination not listed on the previous page: he who considers 
having a commitment not to be a sufficient reason for keeping it but who 
keeps it none the less. One such case I hate discussed in the previous 
chapter; he who doesn't consider the commitment a sufficient reason but 
who keeps the commitment for some other reason. Here 1 think of the man 
who makes up his mind to break some commitment but doesn't do so because 
(a) he repents and changes his mind or (b) he is prevented or forced 
(e.g. falls ill). These two reasons for failing to fail to keep a 
commitment don't alter the guilt of the original decision. Repentance 
never makes it true that there was no wrong, it is precisely a recognition 
and repudiation of that wrong. Accidental prevention likewise doesn't 
alter the decision that was made. No corrupt act occurs, but since 
corruption is in general not regarding a commitment as a sufficient 
reason for acting, and in this case it was not so regarded to the extent 
of a decision to do otherwise, this seems to show some corruption and we
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may agree with Arietotle that 'choice is thought to discriminate 
characters better than actions do* (Nic.Eth.III.2). Of course, he vdio 
repents is less corrupt than he who is simply prevented or forced, for 
there is good reason to t hink that he regards consnitraents more seriously*
So far I have considered only the mem who, having undertaken 
a commitment in all good faith, decides later to break it. But the 
formulation applies equally well to various arch villains, such as Pope 
Alexander VI, Madame de Merteuil in Les Liaisons Dangereuses, Uriah 
Heep etc. !Diese do not simply break commitments, they undertake them 
with the intention of breaking them. Thus for example Madame de Merteuil 
wins the trust of a young girl and her mother in order to do them harm; 
she undertakes to serve their welfare precisely in order to destroy it.
The settled choice and carrying out of such a project shows a disregard 
for the binding force of commitments far greater than he who undertakes 
a commitment in good faith and then breaks it. But we may still use the 
failure or refusal to regard a commitment as a sufficient reason (or as 
any reason at all) for acting as the criterion of corruption.
What about those who undertake a commitment without the intention 
of keeping it? They do not, like the previous lot, undertake to do x 
precisely in order to get the opportunity to do no$-x. Simply, agreeing 
to take on the commitment seems to them the thing to do and they give no 
thought to keeping it. The fact that they have made the commitment makes 
them no more inclined to do what they are committed to than they were 
before making it. For example, the following argument (quoted by Messrs. 
Jacks and Marks and Mrs. Cox in their recent book 'Rape of Reason' p.33): 
Anyone who wants a job must sign a contract* Therefore acceptance of 
this contract is not freely decided upon; there is only the 'negative 
Choice' of refusal. 'Where there's no say there can be no responsibility 
except the practical one of not getting caught'. The contract need not 
be kept.
This is according to my criterion corrupt; a contract is under­
taken with no acceptance that this is any reason, let alone a sufficient
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one, for keeping it. It will be kept only so far as it suits the 
contractor.
But, it may be objected, this is not supposed to be just the 
announcement of a decision to break a contract, but a justification for 
contract-breaking; if justified, how could it be corrupt? Perhaps my 
criterion is too strong. As it stands this argument doesn't provide a 
convincing justification; it would seem to undermine all bargains and 
presumably frees the employer from the obligation to pay the employee 
since you can't get someone to do a job without promising to pay him for 
it. However let us strengthen the argument with a particular context 
(I suspect something like this was what the perpetrator of the above 
had in mind). A totalitarian government will only permit jobs to go to 
those who take ein oath of loyalty to the Party. The alternative is near 
starvation and complete outcast status. The party line is unjust, 
illiberal and mendacious. Might one not be justified in making a commit­
ment without the intention of keeping it? Or, to return to an earlier 
case, suppose a judge or public servant is confronted by a blackmailer 
who threatens to ruin not the man himself but some other person, let us 
suppose innocent, unless the man agrees to hand over the building contract, 
acquit the prisoner or whatever. (Perhaps one might introduce a threat 
from the mad scientist with the deadly virus). Might not these beleaguered 
sods be justified in failing to fulfil their commitments?
The answer to the question about justification doesn't answer 
the question about corruption. It may be that on some occasions the 
deliberate abandoning of a serious commitment presents itself as a 
necessary thing to be done. Possibly it is justified if all the 
alternatives are worse. One doesn't need to be a utilitarian to generate 
such situations; even if there are some things one will absolutely not 
under any circumstances do, it is easy enough to find situations not 
involving these things where the choice is between breaking or insincerely 
undertaking a serious commitment and something in some way worse. One
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may justifiably say: I had to. However there is no reason to conclude 
from this (euid good reason not to) that corruption is avoided. After 
all, in the situations described the circumstances in which the decision 
must be made are engineered by evil men. It should be no surprise in 
such situations that the best one can do is bad. These are situations 
not where the necessity cancels the corruption, but where one is required 
to sacrifice one's integrity; when all the alternatives are evil, 
integrity may become a luxury and insisting on preserving it impermissible 
pride. In corrupt situations it may not be possible to avoid corruption. 
Bruno Bettelheim in the piece quoted at the end of the last chapter 
emphasised the importance of distinguishing the two questions, what must 
I in this situation do, and, is it good, bad or indifferent. Here again 
there are obviously degrees of corruption. One who commits one corrupt 
action under this kind of severe necessity but who continues outside 
such situations to regard commitments as providing a sufficient reason 
for acting is far less corrupt than one who abandons this standard and 
regards commitments as breakable at will. But the possibility of æuch 
unavoidable conflicts is one thing which makes forgiveness an essential 
ingredient of the moral life and not an optional extra for saints.
What these cases seem to show is that we cannot sustain the 
strict connection of corruption both with the breaking of commitments 
and with the imperative to act. The first has been the subject of ray 
argument so far. The second, the connection with action, has not been 
made explicit, but in our talk and thought about corruption surely there 
is something of the following: if action A is corrupt it must never be 
performed. The argument based on the two cases uses this by saying: in 
these cases commitment-breaking is not forbidden but may even be required. 
Therefore in these cases it is not corrupt. This follows quite strictly 
and we cannot keep both the conclusion and my criterion. I have argued 
that it is the invariable imperative which must be abandoned. Maybe 
sometimes we must do something which we ought not to do.
I now raise the case of Saul of Tarsus. He had an undertaking
to persecute Christians which, as a result of whatever happened on the 
road to Damascus, he deliberately broke. It cannot be said that in 
undertcdcing to persecute Christians he was betraying some prior commit­
ment, as Judas was. 'Persecute* is a perjorative word - the story is 
told by the Christians - but whatever one's attitude to liberal toleration 
it cannot be maintained that it is a commitment which everyone has whether 
he likes it or not, as I argued was the case for truthfulness and loyalty. 
Even John Stuart Mill allows that Marcus Aurelius's persecution of the 
Christians was an act of integrity. Saul may well have felt that his 
commitment to the old religion and its values required him to do his best 
to prevent the spread of the new sect, correctly regarded as subversive 
of them. ;0n my account, then, it seems that Paul's change of heart is 
corrupt. Yet not only do we not view it in this way, but his altered 
course seems evidence of integrity. How can I explain this?
This was a matter of conscience. Conscience makes a certain 
claim to override all other commitments. Why should this be? I take 
conscience here to be a fundamental moral conviction that something is or 
isn't to be done, that to omit or to do it would be evil. It is a moral 
belief of a deeply compelling kind. Aquinas both explains and justifies 
the fact that conscience is felt to be binding even when dt is 'objectively' 
mistaken. Conscience is a form of judgment, presenting a certain act or 
omission as evil. If one disobeys conscience one is accepting this 
character of evil in the act one does. But we cannot think of a man as 
good if he^ willing to do evil.
My claim then Is that while Paul had no prior commitment not 
to persecute Christians, he had a prior commitment to follow his conscience. 
When his conscience underwent radical change, the path of integrity was 
to follow it on its new course. He did have a prior commitment but there 
was a change in what fulfilling this commitment amounted to. He was 
committed to persecute Christians primarily on grounds of conscience, 
and when his conscience changed so did his obligation. His agreement with
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the Chief Prints was of his own seeking; nothing depended on it for them 
and it was clearly overriden by his conversion. Thus our conviction that 
Paul was not corrupt is compatible with my claim that failing to regard 
a commitment as a sufficient reason for fulfilling it is sufficient for 
corruption, if we add the condition that this failure is not the result 
of a conviction that some other moral commitment is more binding.
But we may have some doubt as to whether this solution will apply 
to all such cases. The binding force of both Paul's anti-Christian and 
his Christian commitment rested on his own religious conviction, therefore 
when he lost his ealier conviction the binding force of the commitment no 
longer remained. But a man might have a commitment to other people which 
he himself has made of the most binding kind. Let us suppose that he then 
has a change of conscience which convinces him that he must break this 
prior commitment. This doesn't remove the prior commitment, and however 
binding the new conviction of conscience, it may not prevent the breaking
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of the /commitment from amounting to treachery. The following might be an 
example. A man belongs to a group of freedom fighters bound together by 
the closest ties of personal loyalty. He comes to believe that either 
their methods or perhaps their cause itself is deeply wrong, and moreover 
that it is morally essential for him to stop them from doing something 
they propose to do. Newspapers provide us with a choice of possibilities 
as to what this might be. The only way he can stop them is by betraying 
them. This in my view amounts to treachery and therefore corruption, 
whatever his moral conviction. Again, it may be that corruption cannot 
always be avoided. But it will make a difference to its degree whether 
treachery is the result of fear or greed, or the result of such a moral 
conviction.
So far the kinds of corruption examined have been those where 
a deliberate choice is made to abandon particular commitments. But there 
are also kinds of corruption which can grow out of the intolerable 
discomfort of the akratic situation. A common one is hypocrisy. Not the
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hypocrisy of Madame de Merteuil and Pecksniff who undertake commitments 
without any Intention of keeping them. But a 'mild' hypocrisy, which 
makes professions of commitment and the appearance of commitment do duty 
for the actual keeping of them. This is a fairly clear case: though such 
a person's professions may not be totally insincere, it is clear that he 
doesn't regard his having some commitment as a sufficient reason for him 
to keep it, only for seeming to do so. There is often self deception as 
well.
A case which deserves more attention is that of the man vdio 
retires from the battle. "I feel no remorse for having seduced you; X am 
an inveterate sensualist and not responsible for my actions". This man, 
Totsky from Dostoyevsky's 'Idiot', was the guardian of the girl he is 
speaking to and could be held perhaps to have a commitment not to seduce 
her. T/tCs attitude, although perhaps admitting in theory the binding­
ness of commitments, simply refuses to play. The apparent plea of in­
capacity is not a description of the situation, it is a deliberate 
rejection of integrity, of the attempt to keep commitments and to act 
according to what one thinks best. He is not going to bother to think 
about what is best any more. The case bears some resemblance to the 
confirmed akratic, with this difference, that this man has stopped setting 
his will against his lack of integrity but rather has accepted it. He 
stops the conflict by giving up the judgment - at least as a judgment 
which has any effect on his actions - which his desires oppose. This is 
what happens when we say that a person is corrupted ^  something - e.g. 
money, power, luxury. The attachment to whatever it is becomes so great 
that the judgment no longer operates. It may send a few messages but it 
no longer directs actions according to what is thought best. He 'thinks 
he should pursue such pleasures without reserve', or rather, that he 
is just going to, whatever. Such a person certainly doesn't take having 
commitments as a sufficient reason for keeping them; _ there
is no overall judgment exercised, and reasons become instrumental* The 
best reason for acting is that it will achieve the desired object; there
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is no assessment of the object itself* This is replaced by strong 
attachment* This abdication is surely a form of corruption; the 
abandonment of the attempt to judge what is best is what gives them the 
name of 'slaves' of whatever they are attached to.
Self deception might seem to pose a problem for my view.
The very deviousness of the self-deceiver would seem to indicate that 
he does take a commitment as a sufficient reason for acting. I include 
here the avoidance of knowledge: the project of believing what may well 
be false, rather than what is false. And the kind of self-deception which 
raises an issue here is that which prepares the way for an action, rather 
than that which falsifies the past. I take two examples. First, a 
simplified version of Lydgate's vote in the hospital chaplaincy affair, 
in 'Middlemarch'. lydgate deceives himself as to his motive. He persuades 
himself that he votes for Tyke because Tyke is the right man; in fact he 
does 80 to keep Bulstrode's favour which he needs if he is to be in charge 
of the new hospital. He fails in loyalty to his friend Farebrother, 
the other candidate. (This presentation does less than justice to lydgate 
but will do as an example). This is a familiar situation of self- 
deception in a single case. lydgate's main falsifying efforts go into 
his own motive, but falsification of the situation itself may also take 
place, ^ ^^e may manufacture the belief that the situation is not such 
as to require action, as John Dashwood persuades himself, in a masterly 
performance, that his promise to his father to his half sisters
doesn't actually require him to do anything at all, though he is rich 
and they are, for gentlefolk, poor. (Sense and Sensibility).2
These are people whose self-deception gets them out of particular 
commitments. Bulstrode himself is more thorough. He sets out in life with 
a commitment to serve God under a Calvinistic banner. He is deflected by 
the chance of a dubious fortune (in pawnbroking) and reinterprets his 
commitment to God, so thoroughly that with reasonable servicing the 
adjustment lasts most of his life, so that it 'requires' him to become 
as rich and successful as he can (because he will make such good use of
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the goodies).
"There may be coarse hypocrites, who consciously affect beliefs 
and emotions for the sake of gulling the world, but Bulstrode
was not one of them. He was simply a man whose desires had
been stronger than his theoretic beliefs, and who had 
gradually explained the gratification of his desires into 
satisfactory agreement with those beliefs."
Here is another wsy in which people may become corrupted by money,power,
etc.: instead of abandoning judgment, they permit the desire to alter
the content of the commitment.
It seems that these self-deceivers must believe that a coraaiit-
ment is a sufficient reason for acting; their efforts to avoid the
knowledge that what they propose to do is a violation of some commitment
seems to show that if they did face this knowledge they would feel bound
to uphold the commitment. Nevertheless one can hardly escape an otherwise
just charge of corruption by deceiving oneself concerning what one is
doing. Self-deceivers have a lot in common with what I have called mild
hypocrites: the latter seek to behave corruptly while retaining the
respect of others, based on false belief, while the former seek to do as
they please while retaining self-respect, also based on false belief.
From the agent's point of view the obligation to keep cmamit-
ments is the obligation to keep what one believes to be one's commitments.
This is what the self-deceiver relies on. He does fulfil what he
believes to be his commitments, but his belief about what he is obliged
to do is itself corrupt. - The
point of a belief about what it is right to do is that one should conform
one's action to it; the self-deceiver conforms his belief about what
should be done to what he wants to do. A man can't escape the charge of
corruption if his seeming integrity is based on a corrupt belief. The
self-deception is corrupt because it is an instrument for avoiding
commitments.
But what is it for a belief to be corrupt? Not falsehood. A 
corrupt belief might even be true. But if so this will be no thanks to 
the believer. A corrupt belief is one believed for motives rather than 
reasons. It is held not as a result of any attempt to investigate evidence
or argument which might support the truth of the belief, but as a result
of a desire that it be true. A man's belief is not corrupt simply when
he hasn't considered all the evidence or argument which he could find if
he tried; this would be a ridiculous standard. It is corrupt when he
discounts evidence he already has or avoids considering any lest it
give him the wrong answer. Kant in his fierce way gives the example of
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a lover who believes his beloved has no faults. %e evidence that she has 
is under his nose, but he doesn't want to know. I call such beliefs 
corrupt on the same sort of grounds as I gave for holding that there is 
a commitment to speak the truth: to have a belief is to believe it to be 
true, but the self-deceiver is prepared to believe what is false to be 
true.
How does all this fit with my criterion? I suggested, against 
my position, that the self-deceivers do seem to regard a commitment as a 
sufficient reason for keeping it, since they so strenuously avoid admitting 
that they are breaking it. However this isn't a correct account of the 
matter. The project undertaken is that of avoiding keeping the commitment 
while retaining the belief that they have done so. A belief that 
commitments are to be kept could hardly explain this project. The self- 
deceiver, by compartmentalising his mind or some such device, may succeed 
in holding, in general, the belief that having a commitment is a sufficient 
reason for keeping It (he may, like Bulstrode, have a sharp eye for 
dereliction by others). But the important thing is whether he takes the 
particular commitment in question as a sufficient reason for keeping it.
To this, since he seeks to avoid keeping it, the answer is no. (To avoid 
keeping a commitment is of course different from trying to avoid having 
to do what the commitment enjoins by getting released from it. If a man 
is released in time, there is no longer any commitment to break. The 
attempt to be released could be explained in part by the belief that 
commitments are binding, the attempt to break it not).
Self-deception is philosophically difficult. The extent to 
which the various beliefs and processes of thought are conscious, and if
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unconscious what it is to have an unconscious process of thought or 
project, are not questions I can go into here although a full account 
of this form of corruption would have to be based on a philosophical 
account of self-deception. But it does seem that if we allow that such 
a thing as self-deception happens at all, we have to postulate seme 
•deeper* belief which conflicts with the engineered surface beliefs and 
accounts for their formation and also for the maintenance of some kind 
of barrier against their being destroyed by a perception of the truth.
In these cases of corruption there is, at the deeper explanatory level, 
a rejection of a commitment as providing a sufficient reason for keeping 
it, since part of the project at this level is avoiding having to keep 
the commitment.
But this raises a further question about self-deception. I have
been claiming only that self-deception cannot save a man from the charge
of corruption. But my remaiks about corrupt belief raise the question 
whether self-deception is itself a form of corruption. Is it morally 
corrupt to have corrupt beliefs?
It may seem that my question is already answered by the parallel
between lying and corrupt belief. Indeed the case is stronger for belief.
For speech carries only the iraplicature that what is said is true; it is 
offered as being true, but there is no contradiction in lying. To have 
the belief that p, however, just is to believe p to be true. The fact 
that self-deception is possible renders it not pointless to decide to 
try as far as possible to believe only what is true. But whereas speech, 
involving as it does a tacit assumption which others are invited to rely 
on but which may be violated, can without difficulty be seen as inviting 
moral assessment, the very inseparability of belief and truth may seem 
to make it a matter of rationality rather than morality. Kant, whose 
moral system includes duties towards oneself, claims that truthfulness 
is such a duty; if it is a duty to oneself which deception violates it 
is reasonable to include self-deception as well as lying as an offence.^
But such a solution would have little bearing on my argument 
concerning corruption, and the considerations I offer must be less con­
clusive. X have argued that self-deception is corrupt when it is adopted 
as a tool to facilitate corrupt behaviour. Now let us consider a man who 
doesn’t retreat into self-deception on some particulair occasion when his
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commitments demand more than he is prepared to supply ^ is simply 
inclined to deceive himself because it is more comfortable that way. The 
desire to live in a more pleasing or comfortable world is surely a major 
motive for self-deception. I claim that such a person cannot be a person 
of integrity ; he has unfitted himself. He may not have taken to self- 
deception in order to evade coimaitments, but one who has retreated to 
comfortable fantasy is not going to recognise commitments if they require 
something too uncomfortable. He has the device for avoiding them ready 
to hand; he has abandoned reality for fantasy for reasons of comfort and 
there is no ground for thinking that commitments, when disagreeable, will 
hold him to reality. The case for calling such a person corrupt is that, 
even if he hasn't yet broken a commitment and has no plan to, he has left 
no room in his character for any operative conviction that commitments 
are binding. And a lesser self-deception might be corrupt in a lesser 
degree in so far as it approaches towards this state. Self-deception 
would then be corrupt still because it involves the absence of the 
required attitude to commitments, even where this absence didn't motivate 
the self-deception in the first place.
But not all self-deception is of this kind. Consider the mother 
who refuses to believe that her son is dead. This self-deception may be 
undertaken in order to make the world more comfortable - or indeed 
tolerable at all - but does not seem to involve a rejection of commitments. 
It doesn't look much like corruption because it has no tendency to spread. 
This has to do with the reason why it is undertaken, which is here not a 
general desire that the world accommodate her. The same may be said of 
one who from charity or affection falsifies the motives and behaviour of 
those around him in their favour. This may make the world more pleasing
to him, but does not seem to make him likely to break ccsnmitments - 
perhaps indeed the opposite.
Finally there is the queer case of St. Francis. St. Francis, 
we are told in the Fioretti di San Francesco, took the belief that he 
was the most sinful of men to be a necessary part of humility, and further 
he thought that this essential virtue required him to do all in his power 
to make sure that he had this belief. Since, being a virtue, it couldn't 
require him to try to become the most sinful of men, this could only be 
for him an exercise in self-deception. Now although we may feel that 
St. Francis, as presented, had made a serious mistake about the require­
ments of humility, it is undeniable that so far from trying to avoid his 
moral commitments he was doing his best to keep them, according to his 
understanding of them. Such self-deception hardly amounts to moral 
corruption.
To sum up, I would clsdm tentatively that there is a certain 
kind of self-deception which amounts to corruption by making integrity 
impossible to him who engages in it. But not all self-deception is of 
this kind, and I am unable to give a clearer characterisatiwi of the 
corrupt kind than ds contained in my description of it on the previous 
page: roughly, that it is motivated by a general desire that the world 
be comfortable. But this is unlikely to prove an adequate distinguishing 
characteristic.
I now summarise the main conclusions of this chapter. I 
characterised the corrupt man as one who does not take the fact that he 
has a commitment to be a sufficient reason for keeping it", ^ where 
there is a more binding commitment (including the commitment
to obey one's conscience) which conflicts with it. This includes among 
the corrupt both those who deliberately break commitments and those who 
make them without intending to keep them. It haus the consequence that 
on certain occasions it may be impossible to avoid corruption. An 
important kind of corruption is that where a man elevates a desire to 
the status of 'ruling passion' at the expense of any attempt to judge
what io beet to be done. Self-deception was held to be corrupt when 
undertaken for the purpose of avoiding commitments and, more tentatively, 
when it makes impossible the operative acceptance of commitments as 
binding.
From time to time I have spoken of degrees of corruption.
Two things seem relevant to the determination of a person's degree of 
corruption
1. The extent of the person's rejection of commitments as binding.
Perhaps he only rejects one; perhaps all* There is an enormous range 
here, from the man who resolves to break a c(xnmitment on one occasion and 
repents before doing so, to the man who is completely unmoved by such 
obligations.
2. The depth of the commitment rejected. Clearly in assessing
degrees of corruption, fundamental commitments are going to count more 
than relatively trivial ones. But there are two scales on which depth 
must be assessed. The first is a subjective one. In a person's own 
moral standpoint, some commitments to values or undertakings to others 
are more embedded than others. For example, telling this lie to this 
friend may be a minor matter while telling that lie to that friend may 
be gross ^achery. Kant, in his discussion of lying, has a charming 
example ;
"An author asks one of his readers, "How do you like my work?"
To be sure, the answer mi^t be given in an illusory way 
inasmuch as one mi^t jest concerning the captiousness of 
such a question. But who always has his wits about him?
The slightest hesitation with the answer is already a 
mortification for the author. May one flatter him, then?"*
Between some two people it may not matter, it amounts to no
more than politeness to give the bo<^  a good word, while between two
other people with a different sort of friendship it may be a betrayal
of assumptions on which their friendship rests to prevaricate or lie
about such a thing, however great the sensitivity of the author. One
test of embeddedness must be how many other elements of the man's life
depend on the commitment. In the first case here, nothing much, in the
*Kant. loc.cit.
second a whole friendship. I cannot give a full account of what it is 
for a commitment to be embedded, but I think it is intuitively clear that 
this is something a commitment can to a greater or lesser extent be.
But the objective scale is also necessary. Madame de Merteuil 
may think nothing of betraying the confidence of a young girl but her 
behaviour remains highly corrupt. One test of objective depth is the amount 
of damage which results from breaking the commitment. Another might be 
how deeply embedded the commitment is in the public realm; the corrupt 
judge breaks a commitment of fundamental public importance. A third test 
might be the extent to which giving the commitment has induced others to 
rely on one; how much trust is being betrayed? (Again, complicated.
Number of trusting people times importance each puts on the trust perhaps; 
but this sounds like one of those impossible utilitarian multiplications).
The extent of the corruption of a person will be determined by 
a combination of the extent of his disregard of commitments and the depth 
of the commitments he disregards. This gives no very precise measure 
and will not always decide the question of which of two people is the 
most corrupt. Such sums are anyway of dubious practical and even more 
dubious moral value. But it does validate the sort of judgments we make 
about relative corruption, such as that a person io slightly corrupt, 
totally corrupt, more corrupt than he was ten years ago.
There may be other kinds of corruption; I claim that what I 
have described is at least one important kind. I have ignored (except 
for some brief remarks in Chapter Two) a very interesting aspect of 
moral corruption: the corrupting of people by the purveying to them of 
corrupt moral values. (As, for example, in the Nazi Youth Movement).
My account shows what it might be for such people to be corrupt; it 
doesn't undertake to say what a corrupt moral value is.
It might be thought that an account of corruption should make 
more of the connection between corruption and certain desires, for 
example, those involved in ambition or jealousy. On my account a person
isn't corrupt simply on account of having such a desire. It doesn't 
allow for the possibility that, for example, it might be corrupt just 
to have the envious desire that harm befall another. According to my 
criterion a man may be corrupt if such a desire achieves a certain 
prominence in his life, at the expense of his commitments and of his 
judgment of what is best. Desires which a man accepts as 'ruling 
passions' may constitute the internal mechanism of corruption: that 
which removes him from the sound state. But his corruption consists in 
his being so removed by whatever (internal) mechanism from that state of 
soundness concerning commitments.
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Chapter Five. Conclusion
Let us see, finally, what are the parallels between natural 
and moral corruption, the naturally sound state and the morally sound 
state.
The naturally sound state was said to be the state in accor­
dance with a thing's natural development, that state into which it will 
develop if left to itself to fulfil its natural tendencies. X did not 
undertake to show that men have a natural tendency to be morally sound.
But there turned out to be a normative element in the identification of 
the sound state of a creature, and in what constituted its natural 
development. The sound state was closely ccMinected with welfare: it was 
a state in which a creature was capable of pursuing its typical activities 
efficiently, and of surviving. Thus a creature in a sound state was a 
good example or specimen of its kind. Corruption was a departure fron 
and destruction of this sound state by an internal process; nothing 
corrupt could be thou^t of as good of its kind.
Turning to morality, I identified integrity as at least a 
necessary ingredient of the sound state. Corruption was a deliberate 
violation and abandonment of integrity. Again the idea of a standard 
was found to apply. In' both the moral and natural cases, the notion 
of soundness provides a minimum standard. It is not a standard of 
excellence, it is a qualifying condition for being a good man or a good 
specimen of one's kind. The man without integrity is, like the natural 
object in an unsound condition, a poor specimen. The corrupt man, like 
the corrupt natural object, is a bad specimen - both are proceeding 
away from the sound condition, rather than simply failing to reach it.
I said that the criteria for reaching this minimum standard, 
and for being corrupt, might be different in the two cases. I claimed 
that we could not think of as good a man who made no attempt to live a 
life which he thought of as worthwhile. And a worthwhile life was one 
which in principle could be offered to others for their validation as
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creatures also having a standpoint from which to judge of goodness or 
otherwise in the world. I am claiming that just as soundness is 
necessary if something is to be considered as a good example of a natural 
kind, so moral soundness, identified in part as integrity, is necessary 
if someone is to be considered a good moral specimen - a good man.
In addition, the notion of a worthwhile life, and the good man as the 
man who tries to live such a , life, gives us the beginnings of
a reason why we should consider moral soundness a necessary (though 
not sufficient) condition for the good life in its fully ambiguous sense, 
in which virtue and human flourishing are united in the idea of human 
excellence. I have, however, given no reason why a man should attempt 
to live a life which he thinks of as worthwhile, rather than one which 
he thinks of as jolly good fun. (These two may not be mutually exclusive. 
But it is noticeable that those who, like Epicurus, have wanted to 
identify them, have often given quite a solemn twist to 'good fun*).
We saw in the natural case a close connection between soundness 
and survival, corruption and extinction. A corrupt natural object was on 
its way to non-existence. I remarked rather dismissively that a man would 
be unlikely to die of moral corruption^  this outcome has to be carefully 
engineered by novelists who are determined that the wicked shall not 
prosper. But it would be a mistake to expect such a thing. However 
naturalistic our ethics may be, there will always be a distinction between 
biological standards of goodness and moral ones - where the moral life is 
taken in a wide sense not as opposed to amoral or immoral behaviour but 
as meaning a man's life as seen, directed, judged by himself. The same 
being may live these'two lives' , in which case the ending of the 
biological life will also be the ending of the moral life. But different 
standards there will always be for the excellence of the two and it 
would be a confusion to think that the badness of moral corruption must 
be judged according to its tendency to end biological life.
Nevertheless we find in the words of Bruno Bettelheim (quoted 
on page 44) a connection of a non-biological kind between integrity and
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survival, corruption and extinction. He actually contrasts biological 
survival and extinction with some other kind of survival and extinction. 
The force of what he says can only be felt by one who is concerned to 
live a life which he thinks of as worthwhile. The kind of survival and 
extinction which he contrasts with the biological is hard to characterise, 
.itoat is feared seems to be the disintegration of the personality when its 
•raison d'Gtre* is removed. A man directs his life according to a 
judgment of what is good. His various judgments of goodness, his values, 
make up his own personal standpoint from which he directs his life in 
accordance with these judgments. If he not merely fails to live up to 
his values but violates his judgment of what is good and what is bad to
the extent where he can no longer claim that his life is in any way
directed by it, he loses this standpoint and his ability to live his life 
rather than simply let it happen to him. His life is then no longer 
worth living; not just in the sense of personal despair but in the sense 
of a judgment that his life is not, and cannot in the future be, worth 
anything. We see an example of this in George Orwell's t.984', when 
Winston Smith, faced with a cage of rats, says "Do it to Julia, not to 
me". This is the ultimate betrayal which destroys him as a man who 
directs his own life. From that moment he ceases to live his life 
in any active sense, and becomes the tool of others who use his continued 
biological existence for their own purposes. We can see that this has
nothing to do with what a man could help. There are grounds for saying
that he couldn't help it and that it was excusable. Nevertheless it is 
so deeply corrupt that he doesn't survive it. Corruption here does end 
in what may be called moral extinction, like the corruption of a living 
system by which it destroys itself.
I turn to another complex of features which we find in natural 
corruption. A corrupt piece of natural stuff is unreliable. You cannot 
expect from it what you would expect from its ^ und counterpart. It is 
in a state of disintegration and is weak for its kind. It will not 
bear the weight which a sound piece will bear. There is a clear parallel
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here with the morally corrupt man. He cannot be relied upon; if a 
person puts trust in him (as he invites him to do) he will be let down. 
Moreover this is not because men are, like spider-webbing, a weak kind 
of thing. From a sound man one can expect more, one can expect to be 
able to rely on him in certain rejects. This is parallel with the 
fact that rotten beams will not hold up a house but sound ones will.
We wouldn't use wood if it were a weak kind of thing.
Also we saw that natural corruption spreads. So does moral 
corruption; once begun it has a tendency to spread to ordinary sound 
members of a community. For example, in Italy there is, or used to be, 
a tax-law which says that a man may not be assessed for tax at more than 
three times the income he officially dec^ Cares. I dare say there is also 
& law which says you mustn't tell lies on tax returns, but the law 
quoted shows that people are assumed to be corrupt with respect to it. 
What is an ordinary citizen to do, faced with this law? The morally 
strong man may refuse to compromise himself; he will need a strong sense
of personal honour, for his telling the truth does nobody else any good
à
and may get him assessed at a ridiculously high figure on the assumption 
that he is lying. But an ordinary decent man is going to shrug his 
shoulders and lie. The corruption of the 'system' has infected him.
But these social considerations may be felt to be rather 
external. In addition, when speaking of unreliability I spoke as though 
it wore just a matter of weakness. This isn't so; corruption involves 
the spread of disintegration within the corrupt object by an internally 
maintained process. I also argued that the akratic is not corrupt, yet 
he is certainly weak, weaker often than the villain.
In the moral case that which corresponds to tiie internal 
natural.process must be in the first instance the acceptance by a person 
of lack of integrity. The deliberate choice to break faith is what 
allows the disintegration of the moral standpoint. This is seen in 
the case of those who we say are corrupted by money, or luxury, or 
ambition, or whatever. They become attached, first amd foremost, to
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money or success and reject anything which would interfere with this*
The corrupt man is not the one who is unreliable and 
untrustworthy in spite of himself, as is the akratic who sets himself 
to combat the weakness; rather he is the man who chooses to break faith, 
who by his own choices is unsound.
The spree d of corruption within a man and the weakness it 
brings can be seen in the case of Bulstrode. X have mentioned his corrupt 
self-deception, a habit of years. Finally he is faced with a blackmailer 
who is likely to blow his carefully built reputation to pieces, but who 
lies seriously ill in his house. He thinks of killing him, tries to 
resist the thought, and finds he no longer has the strength of mind or 
of will to do 80. It is not just that his will is weak; his judgment, 
having always been detennined by his desires, is too feeble to be 
extricated from them.
"...through all this effort to condense words into a solid 
mental state, there pierced and spread with irresistible 
vividness the images of the events he desired. And in 
the train of those images came their apology."
(Middlemarch).
In spite of his resolve to "keep his intention separate from 
his desire" , his well-trained mind produces lots of good reasons why 
Raffles would be better dead; he proceeds to murder him in an oblique 
fashion.
There are a number of factors which promote the spread of 
corruption. One is the search for consistency and for protection*
A corrupt act usually involves deception, and then more deception to 
prevent inconsistencies from revealing the original one. Another, 
also to be found in Bulstrode, is a kind of 'slippery slope' effect: 
once integrity is breached, resistance has a tendency to diminish.
It is true that a breach of integrity may produce a reaction, as lydgate 
recoils from his dishonest vote, but this is a reaction against the 
tendency. Similar, or perhaps identical with, the tendency of resistance 
to diminish, is the tendency of certain pleasures or desires to 'get a 
hold'. This also happens to Bulstrode; his desires have had it all their
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own way and are too strong, have for too long been the directing factors 
in his life, to be resisted. A ï>erson who becomes corrupted by 
ambition or luxury and begins to subordinate his judgment to them, 
becomes less and less able to resist the desires, or do without luxury 
or success. These psychological factors seem to parallel quite closely 
the physical process by which corruption spreads.
Again, in corruption it was seen that to stop the process one 
must cut out part of the corrupting material itself. This also has its 
counterpart. To extricate oneself from corruption one must repudiate 
the desire or the place it held in one's life. Thics is not the same as 
a decision that some other course is better than one which one has been 
following, which results in a change of policy. For in the corrupt case 
one is attached to whatever it is, it is part of what one's life consists 
of. Consider the following piece of invective from Bernard Levin:
"If Mr. Wilson thought it would help him to retain or regain 
office, he would be perfectly willing to introduce legislation 
forbidding doctors to practise medicine even within the NHS, 
let alone outside, and reserving all treatment, including 
surgery, to members of the National Union of Public Qaployees, 
or for that matter the Amalgamated Society of Locomotive 
Engineers and Firemen."
(Times. l4th October 1975)»
I am not concerned with the truth or the justice of this accusation, but 
with what kind of an accusation it is. It is a charge of corruption; 
it claims in effect that Mr. Wilson has been corrupted by power or 
ambition to the extent that he would do anything to keep or regain
office. A man in this state will have, if he is to cease to be corrupt,
to repudiate tiia attachment to power or success, and in a case as 
serious as this is alleged to be, this would mean abandoning an aim 
close to his heart and intimately woven into - if not constituting -
what he takes his life to be. This is, again, a matter of degree;
lydgate is able to regain control over the ambition which leads to his 
dishonest vote.
Here we may note one merciful way in which moral corruption 
is more akin to the corruption of living systems as such than to the
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corruption of stuff. The corruption of stuff can be stopped, but it 
cannot be reversed. That part of the stuff which is corrupt cannot be 
made sound again. In the case of the corruption of living systems - 
my examples were cancer and the species of fowl - there seems to be no 
conceptual reason to deny that corruptic#. can be reversed; one may have 
in cancer to remove misbehaving cells, but if the corrupt activity can 
thus be stopped the system may return to its proper functioning. The 
case is clearer if we allow impoverishment extinction to be
a criterion of corruption. If, as some vegetarians suggest^ we were to 
free all domestic animals, it is again not conceptually impossible that 
they might return to their former vigour. Certainly the reversal of 
moral corruption is possible, at least if moral extinction has not 
already taken place. The attachment which powers the corruption may be 
quite repudiated or (psychologically harder) brought under control.
Corrupt characters may, unlike corrupt bodies, be 'rescued and healed* 
as Dorothea says in my initial quotation.
Our use in moral thinking of the term 'corruption' shows that 
in this area at least we perceive a close link between the moral and the 
natural worlds. The link is more than metaphorical; this use involves 
a claim that there is a moral process affecting men's characters which 
is of the same kind as the corruption to be found in the natural world. 
This is yet another reason, among so many doubts which are now being 
expressed, for thinking that the consideration of principles for ri^t 
action does not exhaust the field of moral philosophy. If moral 
philosophy is confined to the consideration of such principles, the use 
of the terms 'corrupt' and 'corruption' in morality becomes mere insult.
I have tried to show that it is more than this, that moral corruption can 
be understood in the li^t of the natural process called by that name. If 
we take moral corruption seriously, we must accept a strong current of 
naturalism in ethics, and we must also accept the ethical importance of 
a man's character as well as his acti<xns.
